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Abstract
We introduceAk, an extension of the action description languageA (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993)
to handle actions which affect knowledge. We use sensing actions to increase an agent’s
knowledge of the world and non-deterministic actions to remove knowledge. We include
complex plans involving conditionals and loops in our query language for hypothetical
reasoning. We also present a translation of Ak domain descriptions into epistemic logic
programs.1
1 Introduction
Since its introduction, the action description language A has served as a platform
to study several aspects that arise when we try to formalize theories of actions
in logic (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993). A was designed as a minimal core of a high
level language to represent and reason about actions and their effects. Domain
descriptions written in this language have direct translations into extended logic
programs. Extensions to A have been developed to study and reason about the con-
current execution of actions (Baral & Gelfond, 1997), the non-deterministic effects
of some actions (Thielscher, 1994) and to study many instances of the qualification
and ramification problems (Kartha & Lifschitz, 1994), (Kartha & Lifschitz, 1997),
(McCain & Turner., 1997).
In this paper we propose a new action description language called Ak. Ak is a
∗ Partially funded by Argonne National Laboratory under Contract No. 963042401. The research
was partially conducted at the EECS department of the University of Illinois at Chicago.
† Work done while visiting the University of Illinois at Chicago and Bell Labs.
1 This paper extends the results of the work first presented in (Lobo et al., 1997).
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minimal extension of A to handle sensing actions. A sensing action is an action that
does not have any effect in the world. The effect is only in the perception of the
reasoning agent about the world. The execution of a sensing action will increase
the agent’s knowledge about the current state of the world. Take for example a
deactivated agent placed inside a room. The agent has duties to carry out and will
be activated by a timer. Let us assume the agent is always placed facing the door.
The agent, once activated, may become damaged if it attempts to leave the room
and the door is closed. Before the agent tries to leave the room it needs to perform
some act of sensing in order to determine whether the door is opened or not. The
agent has incomplete knowledge with respect to the door. A sensing action such as
looking at the door would provide information to the agent concerning the status
of the door.
In our simple model there will be two sources of knowledge available to an agent:
initial knowledge, i.e., knowledge provided to the agent at initialization time, and
knowledge gained from sensing actions. We will assume that the agent is acting
in isolation. Thus, once an agent has gained knowledge about its world, only its
actions or limitations of its reasoning mechanism (such as limited memory) could
make the agent lose knowledge. We will assume an ideal agent and expect that only
actions can remove knowledge. An action can cause the loss of knowledge if its effect
is non-deterministic. Take for example the action of tossing a coin. We know it will
land with either heads showing or with tails showing, but exactly which cannot be
predicted. Non-deterministic actions and sensing actions have opposite effects on
an agent’s knowledge.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• The language Ak, which incorporates sensing and non-deterministic actions.
• A query sub-language with complex plans that allow hypothetical reason-
ing in the presence of incomplete information. These complex plans include
conditionals (if-then-else) and routines (while-do).
• A sound and complete translation of domain descriptions written in Ak into
epistemic logic programs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start with the
syntax and semantics of domains with deterministic and sensing actions only. Sec-
tion 3 presents the query sub-language of Ak with conditional plans. In Section 4,
the language is extended to include non-deterministic actions and Section 5 adds
loops to the query language. Section 6 gives an outline of epistemic logic programs
as they pertain to Ak. In Section 7, we present the translation of domains in Ak into
epistemic logic programs. In Section 8, we discuss how our work relates to other
work in the field. Section 9 presents a few directions for future work and concluding
remarks.
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2 Ak: Domain Language
2.1 Syntax of Ak
The language of Ak consists of two non-empty disjoint sets of symbols F , A. They
are called fluents , and actions . As in A, fluents are statements or observations about
the world. The set A consists of two disjoint sets of actions, sensing actions and
non-sensing actions. Actions will be generically denoted by a, possibly indexed. A
fluent literal is a fluent or a fluent preceded by a ¬ sign. A fluent literal is negative
when preceded by ¬ and is positive otherwise. Fluent literals will be denoted by f ,
p and q possibly indexed.
There are three kinds of propositions in Ak, object effect propositions, value
propositions and non-deterministic effect propositions.We discuss non-deterministic
effect propositions in Section 4.
Object effect propositions are expressions of the form
a causes f if p1, . . . , pn (1)
where a is a non-sensing action, and f and p1, . . . , pn, with n ≤ 0, are fluent literals.
This expression intuitively means that in a situation where p1, . . . , pn are true, the
execution of a causes f to become true.
When n = 0 in the preconditions of (1) we will write the proposition as
a causes f (2)
A value proposition is an expression of the form
initially f (3)
where f denotes a fluent literal. Value propositions describe the initial knowledge
the agent has about the world.
There are also knowledge laws. Knowledge laws are expressions of the form
as causes to know f if p1, . . . , pn (4)
where as is a sensing action, f is a fluent and p1, . . . , pn are preconditions as in
(1). Intuitively this expression says that in a situation where p1, . . . , pn are true the
execution of as causes the agent to realize the current value of f in the world. We
do not allow sensing actions to occur in any effect proposition.
If n = 0 in (4), we will write the knowledge law as
as causes to know f (5)
At this point we should remark that we are assuming the agent may have in-
complete but always correct knowledge about the world. Propositions and laws in
Ak describe how the knowledge of the agent changes, but if these changes are the
result of propositions like (1) we assume that the effects in the world would be the
same as if the world were in a state where p1, . . . , pn are true, that is, there are not
external entities that modify the world and the specification of the laws are correct
and deterministic.
Definition 2.1
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A collection of the above propositions and laws is called a domain description. A
domain description D is simple if for any sensing action as and any fluent f there
exists at most one knowledge law in D of type (4).
The following example illustrates how knowledge laws can be used to reason about
actions.
Example 2.2
A robot is instructed to replace the bulb of a halogen lamp. If the lamp is on when
the bulb is screwed in, the robot’s circuits will get burned out from the heat of the
halogen bulb, and it will not be able to complete the task. The robot will have to
find a sequence of actions that will allow it to complete the task without burning
out. We assume that the robot is already at the lamp. This is represented by the
following domain description,
D1


r1 : initially ¬burnOut
r2 : initially ¬bulbF ixed
r3 : changeBulb causes burnOut if switchOn
r4 : changeBulb causes bulbF ixed if ¬switchOn
r5 : turnSwitch causes switchOn if ¬switchOn
r6 : turnSwitch causes ¬switchOn if switchOn
It follows from D1 that in the initial state the robot does not know the state of the
switch in the lamp. Hence, there does not exist a way to determine before hand
what will be the result of the action changeBulb. When the robot goes to carry
out the action changeBulb, it could end up in a resulting state in which either
bulbF ixed is true or in a state where it will be burned out and unable to complete
the task. Without knowing whether the switch is on or off, the robot will not be
able to find a plan to accomplish its task. The robot must first check the state of the
switch. After realizing whether the switch is on or off, it will take the appropriate
actions to complete the task. The robot will need a knowledge law such as:
r7 : checkSwitch causes to know switchOn if ¬burnOut
After checking the switch the robot will know whether the switch is on or off.
Sensing gives the robot that extra knowledge it would need to accomplish the task
without burning out and provides a branching point in its hypothetical reasoning.
If the switch is on it will turn the switch and replace the bulb. If the switch is off
it will directly replace the bulb. This conditional reasoning will enable the robot to
show that there is a sequence of actions to accomplish the task.
2.2 Semantics of Ak
The semantics of Ak must describe how an agent’s knowledge changes according to
the effects of actions defined by a domain description. We begin by presenting the
structure of an agent’s knowledge. We will represent the knowledge of an agent by
a set of possibly incomplete worlds in which the agent believes it can be. We call
these worlds situations and a collection of worlds an epistemic state. A situation,
since it could be an incomplete description of the world, will be represented by a
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Fig. 1. Epistemic states for Agent A and Agent B.
collection of sets of fluents. A set of fluents will be called a state. If a formula is
true in an epistemic state of an agent (to be defined later), by our assumption it
means that the agent knows that the formula is true in the real world. Epistemic
states will also allow us to distinguish when the agent knows that the disjunction
f1 ∨ f2 is true from when it either knows f1 or knows f2.2
We will say that a fluent f is true or holds in a state σ (denoted by σ |= f) iff
f ∈ σ. A fluent f does not hold in a state σ (denoted by σ 6|= f) iff f 6∈ σ. σ |= ¬f
iff σ 6|= f . For more complex formulas, their truth value can be recursively defined
as usual. A formula ϕ made of fluents is true in (or modeled by) a situation Σ
(denoted by Σ |= ϕ) if the formula is true in every state in Σ; it is false if ¬ϕ is true
in every state Σ. A formula is true in an epistemic state if is true in every situation
in the epistemic state; it is false if its negation is true.
A situation is consistent if it is non-empty; otherwise it is inconsistent . A situation
is complete if it contains a single state; otherwise it is incomplete. An epistemic
state is inconsistent if it is empty or contains an inconsistent situation; otherwise
it is consistent. An epistemic state is complete if it contains only one complete
situation. Figure 1 shows two consistent epistemic states in which the fact “Ollie is
wet” (represented by wet) is known by Agent A and Agent B. In the epistemic state
(a), containing an incomplete situation, Agent A does not have knowledge about
the weather. In the other epistemic state (b), containing two complete situations,
Agent B either knows it is raining or knows that it is not raining outside. Recall
that epistemic states will be used in the context of plans for hypothetical reasoning.
That is, predicting properties if the plan were executed. Thus, if an agent plans to
execute a series of actions that takes it to the epistemic state (a), it will not know
how to dress if it needs to go outside and does not want to get wet. In the epistemic
state (b), the agent will know how to proceed.
Interpretations for Ak are transition functions that map pairs of actions and
situations into situations. To define when an interpretation models a domain de-
2 Note the similarity with a collection of belief sets in (Gelfond & Przymusinska, 1991).
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scription, we will define an auxiliary function that interprets the effect of actions at
the state level. We call this function a 0-interpretation. 0-interpretations are func-
tions that map actions and states into states3. A 0-interpretation Φ0 is a 0-model
of a domain description D iff for every state σ
1. For a fluent f of any effect proposition of the form “a causes f if p1, . . . , pn”
in D, the fluent f holds in Φ0(a, σ) if its preconditions p1, . . . , pn holds in σ,
2. For a fluent literal ¬f of any effect proposition of the form “a causes ¬f if
p1, . . . , pn” in D, the fluent f does not hold in Φ0(a, σ) if its preconditions
p1, . . . , pn holds in σ,
3. For a fluent f , if there are no effect propositions of the above types, then
f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) if and only if f ∈ σ.
Before we define when an interpretation Φ is a model of a domain description D, we
need the following definition that will let us interpret knowledge laws. The interest
of the defintion will become clear after we explore the scenarion in Example 2.4.
Definition 2.3
Let Σ be a consistent situation, f a fluent and ϕ a disjunction of conjunctions of
fluent literals (preconditions). A consistent situation Σ′ is “f, ϕ-compatible” with
Σ iff Σ′ = Σ whenever f is either true or false in Σ. Otherwise Σ′ must satisfy one
of the following conditions:
1. Σ′ = {σ ∈ Σ | ϕ is not true in σ}
2. Σ′ = {σ ∈ Σ | ϕ is true in σ, f 6∈ σ}
3. Σ′ = {σ ∈ Σ | ϕ is true in σ, f ∈ σ}
Example 2.4
Let us return to the agent scenario from the introduction. Imagine that currently
the agent is deactivated in the room. The agent will be automatically activated
by an internal clock. Then it needs to find the door, leave the room, and perform
some duties. When the agent is initially activated it will know nothing about its
surroundings and will remain ignorant of its surroundings until it performs a sensing
action. We will show how the conditions presented in Definition 2.3 are enough to
represent the result of sensing. Its only action is to look. We assume the action
consist of opening its “eyes” and looking. This domain is represented below with
only one knowledge law,
D2
{
r1 : look causes to know doorOpened if facingDoor
This initial situation of complete ignorance is represented by the situation
{{}, {doorOpened}, {facingDoor}, {doorOpened, facingDoor}}.
If the action look is executed in the real world the agent may find that it is not facing
the door and will not know whether the door is opened or not, this is represented
by the situation
{ { }, {doorOpened} }.
3 0-interpretations and 0-models are similar to interpretations and models for domains in A.
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Another possibility could be that the agent was facing the door and after it is
activated, it will know that it is facing the door and will also know that the door
is not opened
{ {facingDoor} }.
Still another possibility could be that the agent was facing the door and after being
activated, it will learn that it is facing the door and that the door is opened
{ {doorOpened, facingDoor} }.
Since the agent will be doing hypothetical reasoning (i.e. planning) it will have no
way of knowing which situation it will be in until the action is actually executed.
Thus, the agent can only assume that it will be in one of the three situations,
so when the agent analyzes what would be the consequences of executing look it
concludes that the result will take it to the epistemic state that consists of the
following three situations.
1. { { }, {doorOpened} }
2. { {facingDoor} }
3. { {doorOpened, facingDoor} }
Each situation is doorOpened, facingDoor − compatible. The first situation corre-
sponds to the first case of Definition 2.3. The agent knows it is not facing the door
since facingDoor is false in all states contained in the situation. The same cannot
be said for doorOpened since in one state it is false and the other state it is true.
This is to be expected since in this situation the agent is not facing the door, and
it cannot know if the door is opened or closed.
The second situation corresponds to the second case of Definition 2.3. This situation
contains all the states in which the precondition facingDoor is true and the fluent
doorOpen is false. The agent not only knows it is facing the door but also knows
the door is not opened.
The last situation is from the last case of Definition 2.3. In this situation the agent
knows it is facing the door and also knows that the door is opened.
Observe that a result of sensing is that the preconditions of the sensing action
will become known to the agent if the value of the fluent being sensed is initially
unknown. This occurs even if the effect of the action remains unknown after exe-
cuting the action, which hapens in the situation coming from the states where the
preconditions of the execution of the sensing action in a knowledge laws are not
true.
Definition 2.5
A state σ is called an initial state of a domain description D iff for every value
proposition of the form “initially ϕ” in D, ϕ is true in σ. The initial situation Σ0
of D is the set of all the initial states of D.
Definition 2.6
A fluent f is a potential sensing effect of a sensing action as in a domain D if there
is a knowledge law of the form
as causes to know f if ϕ
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in D. We will also say that f is the potential sensing effect of the knowledge law.
The knowledge precondition of a fluent f with respect to a sensing action as in a
domain D is the disjunction ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn if and only if
as causes to know f if ϕ1
...
as causes to know f if ϕn
are all the knowledge laws in which as occurs and f is a potential sensing effect.
Note that if the domain is simple (Definition 2.1) then the knowledge precondition
of any fluent in the domain with respect to any sensing actions is either empty or
it has only one disjoint.
Definition 2.7
Given an interpretation Φ of Ak, Φ is a model of a domain description D, if and
only if for any consistent situation Σ:
1. There exists a 0-model Φ0 of D, such that for any non-sensing action a,
Φ(a,Σ) =
⋃
σ∈Σ
{Φ0(a, σ)}.
2. For each sensing action as, let f1, . . . , fn be the potential sensing effects
of as and ϕi the knowledge precondition of fi with respect to as. Then,
Φ(as,Σ) must be consistent and if n = 0, Φ(as,Σ) = Σ otherwise Φ(as,Σ) =⋂
i∈[1..n] Σi, such that each Σi is a situation fi, ϕi − compatible with Σ.
Φ(a,Σ) = ∅ for any action a if Σ = ∅.
Example 2.8
The third floor agent of a building has the job of making sure the white-board in a
room on that floor is clean. The agent will approach the room, look into the room,
clean the white-board if it is not clean, and then leave the room. We focus here on
“looking into the room”. When the agent looks into the room it will know whether
the white-board in that room is clean. Also if the curtains are open the agent will
learn whether it is raining outside. Sensing actions can not appear in object effect
propositions, but there is no restriction on the number of knowledge laws associated
with a sensing action. Thus, the action could affect the truth value of several fluents
simultaneously. In this example the sensing action lookInRoom will appear in two
knowledge laws. We will see how the resulting situations are f, ϕ-compatible with
the initial situation and briefly discuss the models of this domain description. The
following simple domain description illustrates the scenario,
D3


r1 : initially curtainOpen
r2 : initially lightOn
r3 : lookInRoom causes to know rainOutside if curtainOpen
r4 : lookInRoom causes to know boardClean if lightOn
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The initial situation Σ0 of D3 has four states.
4
Σ0 = { {curtainOpen, lightOn},
{rainOutside, curtainOpen, lightOn},
{boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn},
{rainOutside, boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
There is only one action in D3, and any model of D3 applied to the initial situation
Σ0 may behave in one of the following forms:
Φ1(lookInRoom,Σ0) = {{curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Φ2(lookInRoom,Σ0) = {{rainOutside, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Φ3(lookInRoom,Σ0) = {{boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Φ4(lookInRoom,Σ0) = {{rainOutside, boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Models may differ in how they behave when they are applied to other situations
different to Σ0, but for Σ0 they must be equal to one of the Φi above. Unlike
domains in A in which given an initial situation there is only one model for the
domain, our language allows for several models.
Observe too that since lookInRoom is a sensing action, its occurrence does not
change any fluent’s value. If we start from Σ0, and then reach one of the four
situations, any new execution of lookInRoom will result in the same situation.
To verify that each of the Φi can be a partial description of a model of r3 and
r4, let
Σ1 = { {curtainOpen, lightOn}, {boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Σ2 = { {rainOutside, curtainOpen, lightOn},
{rainOutside, boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Σ3 = { {curtainOpen, lightOn}, {rainOutside, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Σ4 = { {boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn},
{rainOutside, boardClean, curtainOpen, lightOn}}
Note that Σ1 and Σ2 are rainOutside, curtainOpen-compatible with Σ0, and that
Σ3 and Σ4 are boardClean, lightOn-compatible with Σ0, and
Φ1(lookInRoom,Σ0) = Σ1 ∩Σ3
Φ2(lookInRoom,Σ0) = Σ2 ∩Σ3
Φ3(lookInRoom,Σ0) = Σ1 ∩Σ4
Φ4(lookInRoom,Σ0) = Σ2 ∩Σ4
Note also that none of the situations are f, ϕ-compatible with Σ0 by part (1) of
Definition 2.3 because there is no knowledge precondition ϕ of either rainOutside
or boardClean with respect to lookInRoom in the domain description D3 that is
false in any of the states in the initial situation Σ0.
4 Observe that the initial epistemic state of the robot has always a single situation. To be able to
specify more complex initial epistemic states the language must be changed.
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3 Ak: Query language–part I
Given a domain description, an agent would like to ask how the world would be
after the execution of a sequence of actions starting from the initial situation. Using
actions as in A, queries in Ak can be of the form
ϕ after [a1, . . . , an] (6)
where ϕ is a conjunction of fluent literals. The answer to this query will be yes (or
true) in a domain D if for every model Φ of D the test condition ϕ is true in the
situation
Φ(an,Φ(an−1, . . .Φ(a1,Σ0) · · ·))
i.e. the situation that results after the execution of a1, . . . , an from the initial sit-
uation Σ0 of D. The answer will be no (or false) if for every model Φ of D ϕ is
false in Φ(an,Φ(an−1, . . .Φ(a1,Σ0) · · ·)). Otherwise the answer will be unknown.
With this notion we can define an entailment relation between domain descriptions
and queries. We say that a domain D entails a query Q, denoted by D |= Q, if the
answer for Q in D is yes. For example, if we add initially switchOn to D1, it can
be easily shown that
D1 |= bulbF ixed after [turnSwitch, changeBulb]
However, from the original D1 (even including r7) there does not exist a sequence
of actions α such that D1 |= bulbF ixed after α. The inferences from D1 are con-
ditioned to the output of the sensing action: if the switch is on then the sequence
[turnSwitch, changeBulb] will cause the light to be fixed, else the single action
[changeBulb] will fix it. Reasoning in the presence of sensing actions requires the
projections to be over plans more complex than a simple sequence of actions.
We recursively define a plan as follows,5
1. an empty sequence denoted by [] is a plan.
2. If a is an action and α is a plan then the concatenation of a with α denoted
by [a|α] is also a plan.
3. If ϕ is a conjunction of fluent literals and α, α1 and α2 are plans then
[ if ϕthen α1|α] and [ if ϕthen α1else α2|α] are (conditional) plans.
4. Nothing else is a plan.
Now we redefine a query to be a sentence of the form
ϕ after α (7)
Where ϕ is a test condition (a conjunction of fluent literals) and α is a plan.
Example 3.1
5 We will use the list notation of Prolog to denote sequences.
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(Conditionals) Here we add the knowledge law to D1 and rename it D1′ .
D1′


r1 : initially ¬burnOut
r2 : initially ¬bulbF ixed
r3 : changeBulb causes burnOut if switchOn
r4 : changeBulb causes bulbF ixed if ¬switchOn
r5 : turnSwitch causes switchOn if ¬switchOn
r6 : turnSwitch causes ¬switchOn if switchOn
r7 : checkSwitch causes to know switchOn if ¬burnOut
We can define a conditional plan to fix the bulb:
bulbF ixed after [checkSwitch,
if ¬switchOn then [changeBulb]
else [turnSwitch, changeBulb]].
The above query provides two alternatives for reasoning. The else clause is followed
if the test condition is false. A conditional can be expanded to a case statement in
general when reasoning needs to be done along several different sequences of plans.
Note that if the conditional plan was attempted before or without the sensing action
checkSwitch, the query may not succeed because the test condition could evaluate
to neither true nor false but rather unknown. Sensing actions need to be executed
before the conditionals to ensure the test conditions will evaluate to either true or
false.
3.1 Plan Evaluation Function and Query Entailment
To formally define entailment we need to define first the evaluation of a plan in
terms of interpretations. In other words, we define how the plan will change an
initial situation based on an interpretation.
Definition 3.2
The plan evaluation function ΓΦ of an interpretation Φ is a function such that for
any situation Σ
1. ΓΦ([],Σ) = Σ.
2. ΓΦ([a|α],Σ) = ΓΦ(α,Φ(a,Σ)) for any action a.
3. ΓΦ([ if ϕthen α1|α],Σ) = ΓΦ(α,Σ′), where
Σ′ =


ΓΦ(α1,Σ) if ϕ is true in Σ
Σ if ϕ is false in Σ
∅ otherwise
4. ΓΦ([ if ϕthen α1else α2|α],Σ) = ΓΦ(α,Σ′), where
Σ′ =


ΓΦ(α1,Σ) if ϕ is true in Σ
ΓΦ(α2,Σ) if ϕ is false in Σ
∅ otherwise
Definition 3.3
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A query ϕ after α is entailed by a domain description D (D |= ϕ after α) iff for
every model Φ of D, ϕ is true in ΓΦ(α,Σ).
It is easy to check that
D1′ |= bulbF ixed after [checkSwitch,
if ¬switchOn then [changeBulb]
else [turnSwitch, changeBulb]].
It is easy to see the task will be completed regardless of what model we are in. This
is due in part to the combination of the sensing action and the conditional plan.
4 Actions with non-deterministic effects
There are several different reasons why knowledge may be removed from the set of
facts known by the agent. There may be decay of the knowledge, difficulty accessing
the knowledge, or it may execute an action that makes a particular knowledge no
longer valid. In our description we assume an ideal agent; an agent whose knowl-
edge persists and is not subject to any type of failure or obstacles preventing the
quick access of its knowledge. Given this assumption, the first two possibilities for
the removal of knowledge are impossible. However, non-deterministic actions may
remove knowledge. A non-deterministic action is an action in which the outcome
cannot be predicted beforehand. An example of such an action with an unpre-
dictable outcome is the toss of a coin. A coin on a table will show either heads or
tails. Looking at the coin, one can gain knowledge of which side of the coin shows.
Once the action of tossing the coin takes place we are no longer certain of which
side will show. The coin will land and will show either heads or tails. We will not
know which side shows until we do the sensing action of looking. We describe the
removal of knowledge as no longer knowing the truth value of a fluent.
A non-deterministic effect proposition is an expression of the form
amay affect f if p1, . . . , pn (8)
where a is a non-sensing action and f is a fluent. The preconditions p1, . . . , pn are
defined as in equation (1). Intuitively the proposition states that the truth value of
f may change if a is executed in a situation where p1, . . . , pn is true.
When n = 0, equation (10) becomes
amay affect f (9)
We now re-define 0-interpretations to take into account non-deterministic actions.
A 0-interpretation Φ0 is a 0-model of a domain description D iff for every state σ,
Φ0(a, σ) is such that
1. For a fluent f of any effect proposition of the form “a causes f if p1, . . . , pn”
in D, f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) if p1, . . . , pn holds in σ,
2. For a fluent literal ¬f of any effect proposition of the form “a causes ¬f if
p1, . . . , pn” in D, the f 6∈ Φ0(a, σ) if p1, . . . , pn holds in σ,
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3. For a fluent f such that there are no effect propositions of the above types,
f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) if and only if f ∈ σ unless there is a non-deterministic effect
proposition of the form “a may affect f if p1, . . . , pn” for which p1, . . . , pn
holds in σ.
Example 4.1
Our agent is ordered at this time to put ice from a bag into cups. The ice in the
bag is solid. The agent needs to break the ice into pieces that are able to fit in the
cups. The agent decides to drop the bag of ice as a means to complete the task.
D5


t1 : initially inHandIceBag
t2 : initially solidIce
t3 : initially noDrops
t4 : pickUp causes inHandIceBag if ¬inHandIceBag
t5 : drop causes ¬inHandIceBag if inHandIceBag
t6 : drop may affect solidIce if noDrops
t7 : drop may affect solidIce if fewDrops
t8 : drop causes fewDrops if noDrops
t9 : drop causes enoughDrops if fewDrops
t10 : drop causes ¬solidIce if enoughDrops
t11 : checkIce causes to know solidIce
t12 : putIceInCups causes iceInCups if ¬solidIce
This example combines many of the ideas previously presented. Let us examine this
domain description to see how this all fits together.
• Rules t1 - t3 establish what is initially known in the world. The values of all
other fluents are unknown at this time.
• Rules t4 and t5 describe the effect that theactions Drop and pickUp have on
inHandIceBag.
• Rules t6 and t7 describe the non-deterministic effect of the action drop on
the ice.
• Rules t8 - t10 are object effect propositions which ensure that the ice will
break after no more than three drops (i.e. the execution of the action drop
three times). In the example noDrops is equated with 0 drops, fewDrops
with 1 drop, and enoughDrops with 2 drops.
• Rule t11 is the sensing action which allows the agent to know whether the
ice is broken or not after the execution of the non-deterministic action drop.
Rule t12 is the goal of the task the agent is to perform.
The non-determinism appears in the action of dropping the bag of ice. Before
the action is carried out, the agent knows that the ice is solid. After the non-
deterministic action, the agent is no longer certain if the ice is still solid or in
pieces. The knowledge of knowing the ice is solid has been removed. The agent can
only regain that knowledge by performing a sensing action.
If the robot wants to fill the cup with ice it will iterate the process of dropping
the ice until it breaks. A plan to accomplish this goal will look like:
while ¬solidIce do [drop, pickup, checkIce], putIceInCups]
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Adding loops to plans is the topic of the next section.
5 Ak: Query language–part II
If we allow while-loops in our plan we could verify that D5 entails the following
query,
iceInCups after [while ¬solidIce do [drop, pickUp, checkIce], putIceInCups]
Similar to conditional plans, a sensing action is placed before checking the exit
condition of the loop. We extend the definition of plans to include loops as follows.
1. An empty sequence denoted by [] is a plan.
2. If a is an action and α is a plan then the concatenation of a with α denoted
by [a|α] is also a plan.
3. If ϕ is a conjunction of fluent literals and α, α1 and α2 are plans then
[ if ϕ then α1|α] and [ if ϕ then α1else α2|α] are (conditional) plans.
4. If ϕ is a conjunction of fluent literals and α and α1 are plans then
[ while ϕ do α1|α] is also a (routine) plan.
5. Nothing else is a plan.
5.1 Plan Evaluation Function and Query Entailment
To extend the definition of entailment to plans with while loops we need to extend
the definition of the plan evaluation function ΓΦ. We will define this function us-
ing very elementary tools from denotational semantics for programming languages
(as in Chapter 4 of (Davey & Priestley, 1990)). The intuitive idea of the denota-
tional semantics is to associate the execution of a plan (or a program) of the form
“ while ϕ do α” with one of the while-free plans:6
if ϕ then ∅
if ϕ then [α, if ϕ then ∅]
if ϕ then [α, if ϕ then [α, if ϕ then ∅]]
...
If the while-plan terminates then there exists a n such that the nth plan in this
infinite sequence computes exactly the same function that the while-plan computes.
Moreover, for each m < n, the mth plan is an approximation of the computation
of the while-plan. If the while-plan does not terminate, any plan in the sequence
is an approximation of the while-plan but none is equivalent since the while-plan
computation is infinite. Thus, to define this sequence we start by defining a partial
order over the set of functions that map situations into situations. The order will
arrange the functions as in the sequence of plans above.
Definition 5.1
6 Recall that the situation ∅ represents inconsistency.
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Let E be the set of all situations and P the set of all total functions f mapping
situations into situations, P = {f | f : E → E }. We say that for any pair of
functions f1, f2 ∈ P , f1 ≤ f2 if and only if for any Σ ∈ E if f1(Σ) 6= ∅, then
f1(Σ) = f2(Σ).
Then, we associate a (continuous) transformation inside this order to each plan α.
Informally speaking, the transformation starts with the first plan in the sequence
and in each application returns the next element in the sequence. Finally, we will
define the meaning of the plan based on the least fix-points of these transformations.
Let f∅ denote the function that maps any situation into the empty situation ∅.
Definition 5.2
Let α be a plan and Γ a function that maps plans and situations into situations.
Let ϕ be a conjunction of fluent literals. Then, we define the function FΓα,ϕ : P → P
such that for any function f ∈ P ,
FΓα,ϕ(f)(Σ) =


Σ if ϕ is false in Σ
f(Γ(α,Σ)) if ϕ is true in Σ
∅ otherwise
We can define the powers of FΓα,ϕ as follows:
1. FΓα,ϕ ↑ 0 = f∅.
2. FΓα,ϕ ↑ n+ 1 = F
Γ
α,ϕ(F
Γ
α,ϕ ↑ n).
3. FΓα,ϕ ↑ ω = . . .F
Γ
α,ϕ . . . (F
Γ
α,ϕ(F
Γ
α,ϕ(F
Γ
α,ϕ ↑ 0)) . . .) . . ., i.e. the infinite compo-
sition of FΓα,ϕ applied to f∅.
It can be shown that this power is correctly defined. Proof and a formal definition
of powers can be found in Appendix A.
We now extend the definition of the evaluation function ΓΦ to apply to plans
with routines by adding item
5. ΓΦ([ while ϕ do α1|α],Σ) = ΓΦ(α,Σ
′), where Σ′ = F
ΓΦ
ifϕthenα1,ϕ
↑ω
to Definition 3.2. The definition of entailment remains unchanged. That is, D |=
ϕ after α iff for every model Φ of D, ϕ is true in ΓΦ(α,Σ0).
Example 5.3
D5 |= iceInCups after [ while ¬solidIce do [drop, pickup, checkIce],
putIceInCups]
5.2 Plan Termination
Notice that the query above with the while loop could have been written using
three nested conditionals. A more natural example will replace rules t6 − 10 with
the single rule
drop may affect solidIce
However, in this domain we are not be able to prove termination. The verification
of termination is a difficult task, especially for planning. How do we really know
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that the ice will eventually break? Or how do we know that the cup is filling up?
With time the ice will either melt or break, and if we do not place infinitesimally
small amounts of ice in the cup the cup will eventually fill up or we will run out
of ice. We have simplified the problem in our example by adding t6 − t10. These
propositions state that the ice will break with no more than three “drops”.
We are faced with a similar situation in the following example.
Example 5.4
Consider the following situation. On the floor of a room there are cans. An agent is
given an empty bag and instructed to fill the bag with cans. We assume that there
are more than enough cans on the floor to fill the bag. The domain description for
this task is
D4


r1 : initially ¬bagFull
r2 : drop causes ¬canInHand
r3 : drop causes canInBag if canInHand
r4 : lookInBag causes to know bagFull
r5 : pickUp causes canInHand if ¬canInHand
This task of picking up cans and dropping them into the bag involves the repetition
of a small sequence of actions. There is a degree of uncertainty inherent in this
task because it is unknown how many cans are needed to fill the bag. Therefore a
loop that executes the sequence of actions repeatedly until the task is completed is
needed. If the number of cans needed to fill the bag is known beforehand, then the
set of actions would be repeated sequentially for those number of times.
A query that we would like to prove is
bagFull after [lookInBag, while ¬bagFull do [ pickUpCan,
dropCanInBag,
lookInBag]]
Ideally, we would like to use a routine which could solve any type of task that
involves uncertainty of its end. However, each task has its own conditions for termi-
nation. For example, filling the volume of a bag differs from finding an unfamiliar
store in an unfamiliar area based on the vague directions of a stranger. Do we really
know the bag will become full? Or how useful are vague directions such as, “Just
walk down Lincoln Avenue, you can’t miss it” when generating a plan. A hole may
tear in the bag, or suppose that the stranger who had all the best intentions was
mistaken about the location of the store. To ensure termination (either with success
or failure) we need to add to our domain descriptions general axioms or constraints.
We do not have constraints in Ak but we may be able to add them by using other
extensions of A such as the one in (Baral et al., 1997). To address this problem
we should first look at the standard techniques of problem verifications such as
the ones founded in (Aho & Ullman, 1995) or (Cousot, 1990). These classical ideas
have been used by Manna and Waldinger to prove termination of plans with loops
but without sensing actions (Manna & Waldinger, 1987). For sensing, it might also
be useful to consider the techniques described in (Geffner & Bonet, 1998) to detect
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loop-termination using probability approaches. However, analysis of the termina-
tion of plans is outside the scope of this paper. We will discuss in Section 9 how
some of the problems of termination may be addressed in simple situations.
6 Epistemic Logic Programs
In the past, domain descriptions of dialects of A have been translated into extended
logic programs (Baral & Gelfond, 1997; Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993). Extended logic
programs use two types of negation to represent incomplete information. There
is strong or classical negation ¬ and negation as failure not. The semantics of
extended logic programs is defined by a collection of sets of literals called answer
sets (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991). However, we are required to represent incomplete
information that crosses over multiple sets of answer sets. This will be the case in
our translation of domain descriptions into logic programs where situations will be
closely related to sets of answer sets, and domain descriptions act over epistemic
states which are sets of situations. In this case, extended logic programs will no
longer be sufficient to codify domain descriptions.
Gelfond has extended disjunctive logic programs to work with sets of sets of
answer sets (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991). He calls his new programs epistemic logic
programs . In epistemic logic programs, the language of extended logic programs is
expanded with two modal operators K and M . KF is read as “F is known to be
true” and MF is read as “F may be believed to be true.”
Universal and existential quantifiers are also allowed as well as the epistemic
disjunctive “or” which the semantics is based on the minimal model semantics
associated with disjunctive logic programs (Lobo et al., 1992). As an example, when
F or G is defined as a logic program, its models are exactly F and G. Note that the
classical F ∨G cannot be defined as a logic program, because it has models which
are not minimal.
In the rest of this section we will review the syntax and the semantics of the
subclass of epistemic logic programs that will be required to represent our domain
descriptions. Readers interested in more details about epistemic logic programs are
referred to (Gelfond, 1994).
The semantics of an epistemic logic program is defined by pairs 〈A,W 〉. A is a
collection of sets of ground literals called the set of possible beliefs . Each set in A
can be indexed as A = {A1 . . . An}.W is a set in A called the working set of beliefs .
To define the semantics, we restrict our formulas to be: ground literals, a ground
literal preceded by a modal operator, a ground literal preceded by a modal operator
and ¬, or a conjunction of such formulas. The truth of a formula F in 〈A,W 〉 is
denoted by 〈A,W 〉 |= F and the falsity by 〈A,W 〉 =|F , and are defined as follows.
〈A,W 〉 |= F iff F ∈W , when F is a ground atom.
〈A,W 〉 |= KF iff 〈A,Ai〉 |= F, ∀Ai ∈ A.
〈A,W 〉 |= F ∧G iff 〈A,W 〉 |= F and 〈A,W 〉 |= G.
〈A,W 〉 |= ¬F iff 〈A,W 〉 =| F .
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〈A,W 〉 =| F iff ¬F ∈W , when F is a ground atom.
〈A,W 〉 =| KF iff 〈A,W 〉 6|= KF
〈A,W 〉 =| F ∧G iff 〈A,W 〉 =|F or 〈A,W 〉 =|G.
〈A,W 〉 =| ¬F iff 〈A,W 〉 |= F .
〈A,W 〉 |= F or G iff 〈A,W 〉 |= ¬(¬F ∧ ¬G)
Note that when a formula G is of the form KF , or ¬KF , its evaluation in 〈A,W 〉
does not depend on W . Thus, we will write A |= G or A = | G. Moreover, the
evaluation of object formulas does not depends on A. If G is objective we sometimes
write W |= G or W =| G.
An epistemic logic program is a collection of rules of the form
F1 or . . . or Fk ← G1, . . . , Gm,not Fm+1, . . . ,not Fn (10)
where F1 . . . Fk and Fm+1 . . . Fn are (not necessarily ground) objective literals
(without K or M) and G1 . . . Gm are (not necessarily ground) subjective (with
K or M) or objective literals.
Let Π be an epistemic logic program without variables, not, or modal operators. A
set W of ground literals is a belief set of Π if it is a minimal set of ground literals,
satisfying the following properties:
1. W |= F for every rule F ← G1 . . . Gm in Π which W |= G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gm.
2. If there is a pair of complementary literals, i.e F and ¬F , in W then W is
the set of all literals.
Let Π be an epistemic logic program with not and variables but does not contain
any modal operator. Let Ground(Π) be the epistemic logic program that is obtained
from Π by replacing each rule in Π with all its ground instances. Let W be a set of
ground literals ( literals in W and Π are from the same language). ΠW is obtained
from Π by removing from Ground(Π)
1. All the rules which contain formulas of the form not G such that W |= G.
2. All occurrences of formulas of the form not G from the remaining rules.
W is a belief set of Π if and only if W is a belief set of ΠW .
Let Π be any epistemic logic program, and A a collection of sets of literals. [Π]A
is the epistemic logic program obtained by removing from Ground(Π)
1. All rules with formulas of the form G such that G contains M or K, and
A 6|= G,
2. All occurrences of formulas containing M or K from the remaining rules.
A set A is a world view of Π if A is the collection of all belief sets of [Π]A. A world
view of Π is consistent if it does not contain the belief set of all literals. An epistemic
logic program is consistent if it has at least one consistent non-empty world view.
In epistemic logic programs the only working sets of beliefs that are considered are
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world views and the possible belief is always a member of the working set under
consideration (i.e. a belief set).
Let Π be an epistemic logic program and A be a world view of Π. A literal L is
true in A iff for every ground instance F of L, 〈A, Ai〉 |= F for all Ai in A. F is
true in Π, denoted by Π |= F , iff A |= F for every world view A of Π.
Example 6.1
The epistemic program
1. q(a) ← ¬Kp(a).
2. p(a) ← ¬Kq(a).
has two world views
{{p(a)}} {{q(a)}}
In the first world view Kp(a) is true and Kq(a) is true in the second.
The epistemic program
1. q(a) or q(b).
2. p(a) ← ¬Kq(a).
has one world view
{{p(a), q(a)}, {p(a), q(b)}}
Note that Kq(a) is not true in this world view because q(a) is not member of the
second belief set. The main intuition to have when reading a formula of the form
KF is that it will be true iff F is true in every belief set of the program.
7 Translation to Epistemic Logic Programs
In this section we start with a sound and complete translation of simple domain
descriptions into epistemic logic programs. This will let us explain the logic program
rules under the simple scenario and will make clear the rules for the general case.
Our epistemic logic programs will use variables of three sorts: situation variables
denoted by S or S′ possibly indexed, fluent variables denoted by F or F ′ possibly
indexed, action variables denoted by A or A′ possibly indexed, and the special situ-
ation constant s0 that represents the initial situation. We will also have a constant
symbol for each fluent symbol f in the language and we add the constant symbol
f¯ to represent ¬f . For simplicity we will denote the fluent literal constants by the
fluent literal they represent. We will also add the special constant symbol true to
the set of fluent literal constants.
7.1 The Domain Independent Translation
We start by first giving the rules for inertia. These rules encode that a fluent remains
unchanged if no actions that affect the fluent is executed. Whenever a fluent literal
appears as an argument in a predicate, it is representing a corresponding constant
in the program. For any fluent literal l, if l = ¬f , l¯ will denote f in the program.
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For every fluent literal f there is an inertia rule of the form:
holds(f, res(A,S))← holds(f, S),not ab(f¯ , A, S).
For every fluent symbol f there is an or-classicalization rule of the form
holds(f, s0) or holds(f¯ , s0)
The above rule states that our belief sets are complete in the sense that either
holds(f, s0) or holds(f¯ , s0) must be true since f ∨¬f is a tautology in every state.
Note that because of the minimal model semantics interpretation of the “or” we
will not have both holds(f, s0) or holds(f¯ , s0) holding simultaneously.
We will also have two more domain independent rules that we will call rules of
suppression.
holds(true, res(A,S))← holds(true, S)
holds(F, S)← holds(true, S)
These rules will be used to implement compatibility. For example, if a situation
Σ = {σ1, σ2} with two states is split into two situations Σ1 = {σ1} and Σ2 = {σ2},
for compatibility after the execution of a sensing action, Σ1 will be generated by
suppressing σ2 from Σ using these rules. How this is accomplished will become
apparent when we introduce the domain dependent rules produced by the knowledge
laws.
7.2 The Domain Dependent Translation
Value propositions of the form “initially f” are translated into
holds(f, s0)
The translation of effect propositions of the form “a causes f if p1, . . . , pn” is the
standard translation for effect propositions introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz in
(Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993) for A. The translation produces two rules. The first one
is:
holds(f, res(a, S))← holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S)
It allows us to prove that f will hold after the result of the execution of a if
preconditions are satisfied. The second rule is:
ab(f, a, S)← holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S),not holds(true, res(a, S))
where the predicate ab(f, a, S) disables the inertia rule in the cases where f can be
affected by a.
We will introduce the domain dependent translation of knowledge laws using the
following domain description.
Example 7.1
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D01
{
r1 : initially ¬bulbF ixed
r2 : checkSwitch causes to know switchOn if ¬burnOut
In this example the initial situation is:
Σ = {{burnOut,¬bulbF ixed, switchOn},
{burnOut,¬bulbF ixed,¬switchOn},
{¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed, switchOn},
{¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed,¬switchOn}}
after the robot executes the action checkSwitch we will have the following resulting
situations:
Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ) = { {¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed, switchOn}}
Φ2(checkSwitch,Σ) = { {¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed,¬switchOn}}
Φ3(checkSwitch,Σ) = { {burnOut,¬bulbF ixed, switchOn},
{burnOut,¬bulbF ixed,¬switchOn}}
These correspond to the three (switchOn,¬burnOut)-compatible sub-sets of Σ (see
Definition 2.3). Note also that
Φ1(checkSwitch,Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ)) = Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ)
Φ2(checkSwitch,Φ2(checkSwitch,Σ)) = Φ2(checkSwitch,Σ)
Φ3(checkSwitch,Φ2(checkSwitch,Σ)) = Φ3(checkSwitch,Σ)
Our logic program translation of this domain will have three world views, one
corresponding to each of the transition functions Φ1 Φ2, and Φ3. Φ1 is depicted
on the left hand side of the figure below, Φ2 on the right hand side and Φ3 in the
middle.
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¬switchOn
¬burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
¬switchOn
¬burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
switchOn
¬burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
¬switchOn
burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
switchOn
burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
¬switchOn
Φ1
checkSwitch
Φ3
checkSwitch
checkSwitch
Φ1
Φ3
checkSwitch
burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
switchOn
burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
¬burnOut ¬bulbF ixed
switchOn
checkSwitch
checkSwitch
Φ2
Φ2
The world view associated with Φ1 on the left hand side of the figure will have four
belief sets. One will contain the union of the two sets
W 1s0 = {holds(burnOut, s0), holds(bulbF ixed, s0), holds(switchOn, s0)}
and
W 1
res(cs,s0)
= { holds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, s0)),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(checkSwitch, s0),
holds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, s0))}
This union represents the fact that {¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed, switchOn} is an initial
state (encoded W 1s0 ) and that the same set is also a state in Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ)
(encoded inW 1
res(cs,s0)
). The rest of the literals inW 1 are the same as inW 1
res(cs,s0)
except that the situation constant in each literal is replaced by situation constants of
the form res(checkSwitch, res(. . . , res(checkSwitch, s0) . . .)) representing that the
state remains the same after any number of applications of the action checkSwitch
to the state (the loop arc on the left of the figure).
The second belief set will contain
W 2s0 = {holds(burnOut, s0), holds(bulbF ixed, s0), holds(switchOn, s0)}
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representing that {¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed,¬switchOn} is also an initial state. How-
ever, this state is not part of Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ). Then, we need to suppress this
state from the world view. We will do that by adding the set
W 2
res(cs,s0)
= { holds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, s0)),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(checkSwitch, s0),
holds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, s0))
}
⋃
{ holds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, s0)),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(checkSwitch, s0),
holds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, s0)),
holds(true, res(checkSwitch, s0)}
to the belief set. Actually, we will have in the domain dependent translation a rule
that adds holds(true, res(checkSwithc, s0)), and the second domain independent
suppression rule will add the rest. The rest of the literals in W 2 are the same as
in W 2res(cs,s0) except that the situation constant is replaced by situation constants
of the form res(checkSwitch, res(. . . , res(checkSwitch, s0) . . .)) representing that
the state remains suppressed in the result of applying the action checkSwitch to
the state. This is the effect of the first domain independent suppression rule.
The other two belief sets W 3 and W 4 are similar to W 2.
W 3s0 = {holds(burnOut, s0), holds(bulbF ixed, s0), holds(switchOn, s0)}
W 4s0 = {holds(burnOut, s0), holds(bulbF ixed, s0), holds(switchOn, s0)}
The rest of W 3 and W 4 is exactly as in W 2 since the states they represent are also
suppressed from the result.
Note that both holds(f, res(checkSwitch, s0)) and holds(f, res(checkSwitch, s0))
are members of the belief sets W 2,W 3 andW 4, for any fluent f . Therefore, for any
fluent literal g, the proof of holds(g, res(checkSwitch, s0) in the world view is not
affected by these belief sets. The consequence is that we are ignoring three states
after the execution of checkSwitch under the model Φ1.
There are two more world views that correspond to the transitions in the middle
and on the right hand side of the figure. The definition is very similar to the first
world view. There are four belief sets in the middle, two of them suppressing initial
states, and four belief sets in the last world view, three of them suppressing initial
states.
Thus, the domain dependent translation of D01 will be:
holds(bulbF ixed, s0)←
Rule x1 is the translation of rule r1. The rest of the rules correspond to the different
suppression cases since states that are not suppressed by the transition will be
moved to the next situation by the domain independent rule of inertia. Take for
example, Φ1.
Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ) = {σ ∈ Σ|σ |= ¬burnOut, switchOn ∈ σ}
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Hence, we would like to suppress two kinds of states. 1) States where ¬switchOn
is true, and 2) States where burnOut is true. The rule for the first case is:
holds(true, res(checkSwitch, S)) ← Kholds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, S))
Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S)),
holds(switchOn, S) (11)
The first two literals in the body of the rule verify that we are in the case
of Φ1, that is, both switchOn and ¬burnOut are true in every state of the re-
sulting situation (i.e. the two literals Kholds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, S)) and
Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S)) are true). The last predicate checks that
we are suppressing the state where ¬switchOn is true in the current situation (i.e.
holds(switchOn, S)).
The rule for the second case is very similar. We only need to change the last
literal to indicate that we are suppressing the state where burnOut is true (i.e.
holds(burnOut, S)):
holds(true, res(checkSwitch, S)) ← Kholds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, S))
Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S)),
holds(burnOut, S) (12)
Let us look now at Φ2.
Φ2(checkSwitch,Σ) = {σ ∈ Σ|σ |= ¬burnOut, switchOn 6∈ σ}
We also suppress two kinds of states. 1) States where switchOn is true, and 2) States
where burnOut is true. We need to check that ¬switchOn and ¬burnOut are true in
every state of the resulting situation (i.e. Kholds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, S))
and Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S)) are true) to verify that we are in the
case of Φ2. The rules for the cases are:
holds(true, res(checkSwitch, S)) ← Kholds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, S))
Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S)),
holds(switchOn, S)
holds(true, res(checkSwitch, S)) ← Kholds(switchOn, res(checkSwitch, S))
Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S)),
holds(burnOut, S) (13)
For Φ3 all the states where ¬burnOut holds (i.e. holds(burnOut, S)) should be
suppressed since
Φ3(checkSwitch,Σ) = {σ ∈ Σ|σ 6|= ¬burnOut}
To verify that we are in the case of Φ3 we need to check there is at least one state
in the result where burnOut holds (i.e. ¬Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwithc, S))).
The rule for this case is:
holds(true, res(checkSwitch, S)) ← ¬Kholds(burnOut, res(checkSwitch, S))
holds(burnOut, S) (14)
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There is a condition that must be added to all the rules. The condition is that if the
fluent switchOn is already known in the original situation (for example if we have
initially ¬switchOn) then none of the states is suppressed from the situations. In
other words, the rules above applied only if switchOn is unknown. To check that this
is the case we must add to the body of each rule the literals ¬Kholds(switchOn, S)
and ¬Kholds(switchOn, S). These literals are not required in this particular ex-
ample but it must be part of the general case.
In general, knowledge laws of the form “a causes to know f if p1, . . . , pn” are
translated into the rules
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S),
¬Kholds(p1, res(a, S)),
holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S)
...
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S),
¬Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S) (15)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f¯ , res(a, S)),
Kholds(p1, res(a, S)), . . . ,Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(f, S) (16)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f¯ , res(a, S)),
Kholds(p1, res(a, S)), . . . ,Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(p¯1, S)
...
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f¯ , res(a, S)),
Kholds(p1, res(a, S)), . . . ,Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(p¯n, S) (17)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f, res(a, S)),
Kholds(p1, res(a, S)), . . . ,Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(f¯ , S) (18)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f, res(a, S)),
Kholds(p1, res(a, S)), . . . ,Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(p¯1, S)
...
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f, res(a, S)),
Kholds(p1, res(a, S)), . . . ,Kholds(pn, res(a, S)),
holds(p¯n, S) (19)
We have added to every rule the condition ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S). None
of these rules apply if f is currently known. In this case, by inertia everything stays
the same after the execution of the sensing action a. Assume now that neither f
nor f¯ holds in the “situation” S. Thus, according to the definition of compatibility
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(Def. 2.3), we would have three types of world views. 1) One type for which we can
find a pi for each of the belief sets such holds(pi, res(a, S)) does not hold; 2) World
views in which Kholds(f¯ , res(a, S)) and every Kholds(pi, res(a, S)) hold; 3) World
views in which Kholds(f, res(a, S)) and every Kholds(pi, res(a, S)) hold.
Intuitively, to capture these three cases the logic programming rules will suppress
the belief set that breaks the rules. To suppress a belief set in the situation res(a, S)
the rules will add holds(true, res(a, S)) to the belief set, and this atom together
with the second suppression rule will add holds(l, res(a, S)), for every fluent literal
l. Recall that the effect of having every literal hold for a particular situation in a
belief set is that the belief set can be ignored when checking if the literal holds
in the world view. Case (1) is captured by the first set of rules (15). Case (2) is
captured by rule (16) and the set of rules (17). Case (3) is captured by rule (18)
and the set of rules (19).
A non-deterministic effect proposition of the form “amay affect f if p1, . . . , pn”
is translated into
holds(f, res(a, S))← not holds(f¯ , res(a, S)),
holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S)
holds(f¯ , res(a, S))← not holds(f, res(a, S)),
holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S)
ab(f, a, S)← not holds(f¯ , res(a, S)), holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S),
not holds(true, S)
ab(f, a, S)← not holds(f, res(a, S)), holds(p1, S), . . . , holds(pn, S),
not holds(true, S)
To illustrate this translation, we use Rule t6 from domain description D5, and
show how it will work from the initial situation s0. We also include the translation
for t8, holds(noDrops, s0) and holds(solidIce, s0) along with the inertia rule to get
the following program. Notice that the suppression rules do not apply here since
we are not considering any knowledge laws.
holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0))← not holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)),
holds(noDrops, s0).
holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0))← not holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)),
holds(noDrops, s0).
ab(solidIce, drop, s0)← not holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)),
holds(noDrops, s0),not holds(true, s0).
ab(solidIce, drop, s0)← not holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)),
holds(noDrops, s0),not holds(true, s0).
holds(noDrops, res(drop, s0))← holds(noDrops, s0).
ab(noDrops, drop, s0)← holds(noDrops, s0).
holds(noDrops, s0)←
holds(solidIce, s0)←
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holds(noDrops, res(drop, s0))← holds(noDrops, s0),
not ab(noDrops, drop, s0).
holds(noDrops, res(drop, s0))← holds(noDrops, s0),
not ab(noDrops, drop, s0).
holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0))← holds(solidIce, s0),
not ab(solidIce, drop, s0).
holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0))← holds(solidIce, s0),
not ab(solidIce, drop, s0).
The program only has objective formulas. Thus, its semantics is given by its world
view which consists of belief sets (belief sets are the same as answer sets in extended
logic programs). The world view W of the above program is W = {B1, B2}
B1 = { holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)), ab(solidIce, drop, s0),
holds(solidIce, s0), holds(noDrops, res(drop, s0)),
ab(noDrops, drop, s0), holds(noDrops, s0)
}
B2 = { holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)), ab(solidIce, drop, s0),
holds(solidIce, s0), holds(noDrops, res(drop, s0)),
ab(noDrops, drop, s0), holds(noDrops, s0)
}
Notice that the query holds(noDrops, res(drop, s0)) evaluates to true for the
above belief sets. If we were to ask the queries holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)) or
holds(solidIce, res(drop, s0)), we see neither would be able to produce an answer
of yes or no. Both queries’ answer is unknown.
The recursion through negation provides the desired effect of two possible inter-
pretations for the effect of a in f (note that the two first rules of the example have
the form c ← not b and b ← not c and this program has two answer sets, one is
{c} and the other is {b}).
The translation of a domain D is defined as the union of the domain dependent
and domain independent rules.
7.3 General Domains
The assumption that we made for simple domains was that for any sensing action
as and fluent f there is at most one knowledge law of the form
as causes to know f if p1, . . . , pn (20)
Suppose now we have the following domain
D
{
r1 : lookInRoom causes to know boardClean if curtainOpen
r2 : lookInRoom causes to know boardClean if lightOn
and assume we start with the following situation
Σ = {{boardClean, curtainOpen}, {boardClean, lightOn}, {boardClean}, {}}
There is one model Φ1 that will result in the states where the fluent boarClean
is true and the knowledge precondition curtainOpen∨ lightOn of boardClean with
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respect to lookInRoom is also true (this corresponds to the third case of compati-
bility).
Φ1(lookInRoom,Σ) = {{boardClean, curtainOpen}, {boardClean, lightOn}}
We will need a suppression rule similar to the rules in group (19) of the translation
of simple domains. The rule will be something like
holds(true, res(lookInRoom, S))
← ¬Kholds(boardClean, S),¬Kholds(boardClean, S),
Kholds(boardClean, res(lookInRoom, S)),
“Kholds(curtainOpen ∨ lightOn, res(lookInRoom, S))”,
holds(curtainOpen, S), holds(lightOn, S),
The question is how to encode “Kholds(curtainOpen ∨ lightOn, . . .)”? We will
do it by adding two rules to the program
holds(plookInRoomboardClean , S)← holds(curtainOpen, S)
holds(plookInRoomboardClean , S)← holds(lightOn, S)
Now the disjunction can be replaced by “Kholds(plookInRoomboardClean , res(lookInRoom, S))”.
The symbol plookInRoomboardClean is a new constant symbol not appearing anywhere else in
the program. We complete the program with the rule
holds(plookInRoomboardClean , S)← not holds(p
lookInRoom
boardClean , S)
and the translation becomes
holds(true, res(lookInRoom, S))
← ¬Kholds(boardClean, S),¬Kholds(boardClean, S),
Kholds(boardClean, res(lookInRoom, S)),
Kholds(plookInRoomboardClean , res(lookInRoom, S)),
holds(plookInRoomboardClean , S)
In general, ifD is a domain description (not necessarily simple) then, for any sensing
action a and any fluent f , if ϕ1∨. . .∨ϕm with ϕi = pi1∧. . .∧p
i
ki
, i = 1, . . . ,m, is the
knowledge precondition of f with respect to a in the domain D, we will have a new
constant symbol paf in the language of the logic program. Then for the knowledge
laws:
a causes to know f if ϕ1
...
a causes to know f if ϕm
the domain dependent translation will have the rules:
holds(paf , S) ← holds(p
1
1, S), . . . , holds(p
1
k1
, S)
...
holds(paf , S) ← holds(p
m
1 , S), . . . , holds(p
m
km , S) (21)
holds(paf , S) ← not holds(p
a
f , S) (22)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S),
¬Kholds(paf , res(a, S)),
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holds(paf , S) (23)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f¯ , res(a, S)),
Kholds(paf , res(a, S)), holds(f, S) (24)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f¯ , res(a, S)),
Kholds(paf , res(a, S)),
holds(paf , S) (25)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f, res(a, S)),
Kholds(paf , res(a, S)), holds(f¯ , S) (26)
holds(true, res(a, S)) ← ¬Kholds(f, S),¬Kholds(f¯ , S), Kholds(f, res(a, S)),
Kholds(paf , res(a, S)),
holds(paf , S) (27)
The set of rules (15) corresponds to rule (23). Rule (16) corresponds to rule (24).
The set of rules (17) correspond to rule (25). Rule (18) corresponds to rule (26)
and rule (19) corresponds to rule (27).
7.4 Query Translation
To answer queries in the epistemic logic program we need to include rules to imple-
ment the evaluation functions Γ. The query “f after α” will be true in a consistent
domain D if and only if holds after plan(f, α) is true in the epistemic logic pro-
gram obtained from D plus the rules
holds after plan(F, P )
← find situation(P, s0, S), holds(F, S)
find situation([], S, S)
←
find situation([a|α], S, S1)
← find situation(α, res(a, S), S1)
find situation([ if ϕ then α1|α2], S, S1)
← Kholds(ϕ, S), find situation(α2, S, S1)
find situation([ if ϕ then α1|α2], S, S1)
← Kholds(ϕ, S), find situation(α1, S, S
′),
find situation(α2, S
′, S1)
find situation([ if ϕ then α1 else α
′
1|α2],
S, S1)
← Kholds(ϕ¯, S), find situation(α′1, S, S
′),
find situation(α2, S
′, S1)
find situation([ if ϕ then α1 else α
′
1|α2],
S, S1)
← Kholds(ϕ, S), find situation(α1, S, S
′),
find situation(α2, S
′, S1)
find situation([ while ϕ do α1|α2], S, S1)
← Kholds(ϕ¯, S),
find situation(α2, S, S1)
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find situation([while ϕ do α1|α2], S, S1)
← Kholds(ϕ, S),
find situation(α1, S, S
′),
find situation([while ϕ do α1|α2], S
′, S1)
As you may note from the rules, holds after plan(F, P ) works in two steps. First,
it finds the situation s that results from applying P to the initial situation (using
find situation(P, s0, S)) and then shows that F holds in that situation. Since the
translation of the domain may have several world views the program needs to find
a situation for each world view. The following example illustrates how the process
works.
Example 7.2
D11


r1 : initially ¬burnOut
r2 : initially ¬bulbF ixed
r3 : changeBulb causes burnOut if switchOn
r4 : changeBulb causes bulbF ixed if ¬switchOn
r5 : turnSwitch causes switchOn if ¬switchOn
r6 : turnSwitch causes ¬switchOn if switchOn
r7 : checkSwitch causes to know switchOn if ¬burnOut
Assume we would like to show that
D11 |= bulbF ixed after [ checkSwitch,
if switchOnthen [turnSwitch],
changeBulb]
The states in the initial situation of this example are:
Σ = { {¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed, switchOn},
{¬burnOut,¬bulbF ixed,¬switchOn}}
It has two models Φ1 and Φ2 that for the sensing action checkSwitch behave
very much like in Example 7.1. Then, the logic program translation of this domain
has two world views. The world view W corresponding to Φ1 has two belief sets
W 1 and W 2, such that W 1s0 ∪W
1
res(cs,s0)
from Example 7.1 is a subset of W 1 and
W 2s0 ∪W
2
res(cs,s0)
is a subset of W 2. W 1 also contains the sets
W 1res(ts,res(cs,s0)) =
{holds(burnOut, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)),
holds(switchOn, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)))}
and
W 1
res(cb,res(ts,res(cs,s0)))
=
{holds(burnOut, res(changeBulb, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)))),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(changeBulb, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)))),
holds(switchOn, res(changeBulb, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))))}
and W 2 the set
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W 2
res(ts,(res(cs,s0)))
= {holds(burnOut, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))),
holds(switchOn, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)))}⋃
{holds(burnOut, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))),
holds(bulbF ixed, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))),
holds(switchOn, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))),
holds(true, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)))}
There is also a similar set W 2
res(cb,res(ts,(res(cs,s0))))
, with the same elements of
W 2res(ts,(res(cs,s0))), replacing the situation argument with
res(changeBulb, res(turnSwitch, (res(checkSwitch, s0))))
This corresponds to the sequence
Σ,
Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ),
Φ1(turnSwitch,Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ)),
Φ1(changeBulb,Φ1(turnSwitch,Φ1(checkSwitch,Σ)))
Thus, in this world view the predicate
find situation([ checkSwitch,
if switchOn then [turnSwitch],
changeBulb], s0, S)
will hold in W iff S = res(changeBulb, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0))).
The second step will check if
holds(bulbF ixed, res(changeBulb, res(turnSwitch, res(checkSwitch, s0)))
is in W . The answer is yes since the atom belongs to both W 1 and W 2.
The world view associated with Φ2 is defined in a similar manner, but in this
world view S = res(changeBulb, res(checkSwitch, s0)).
Let ΠD be the epistemic logic program corresponding to the translation of a
domain description D, and denote by ΠQD the union of ΠD and the rules to interpret
queries given above. Then we can show:
Theorem 7.3
Given a consistent domain description D and a plan β. D |= F after β iff ΠQD |=
holds after plan(F, β).
Proof: see appendix.
8 Relation to Other Work
In (Levesque, 1996) there is also a programming language based on the situa-
tion calculus which uses sensing actions. This work is based on previous work
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from (Scherl & Levesque, 1993), in which knowledge is represented using two levels.
There is a representation of the actual situation (called s) in which the agent is in,
and there are situations accessible from s (called s′) which the agent thinks it might
be in. Something is known to the agent as being true (false) if it is true (false) in
all situations s′ which are accessible from the actual situation s and is unknown
otherwise. In other words (Scherl & Levesque, 1993) distinguishes between what is
known by the agent and what is true in world. We only represent what is know by
the agent, and assume that this knowledge might be incomplete but always correct.
Something is known in our representation if its value is the same throughout the
states in a situation and unknown otherwise.
In (Levesque, 1996; Scherl & Levesque, 1993) the authors use preconditions which
are executability conditions for an action’s execution. For example, a precondition
to clean a white-board is one must be in front of the white-board. Our precondi-
tions differ in that they are conditions on the effects. We can always execute an
action but its effect varies according to its precondition in the effect propositions.
Extending Ak to include executability conditions can be done as for extensions of
A. The use of conditions on effects however allows us to represent a phenomenon of
sensing in which the value of previously unknown preconditions are learned along
with the fluent we are trying to gain knowledge about. This is shown in examples
2.4 and 2.8 where the robot will know whether or not it is facing the door after
executing the action look.
In (Levesque, 1996) once knowledge is gained it is never lost. We, on the other
hand, explore the use of non-deterministic actions as a mechanism to remove knowl-
edge. Our use of non-deterministic actions is similar to (Thielscher, 1994) where the
effect of a non-deterministic action is to make a fluent true or false, but exactly
which is indeterminate. As might be expected, there are cases where the possible
outcome is not intuitive. Take for example a deterministic action Shoot that causes
Ollie to be dead. Any observation, which depends on Ollie being alive, such as “Ol-
lie is walking” can be made false using the same action Shoot. Shoot can be used
as a restriction which causes Ollie not to walk. In the resulting situation, Ollie will
not be alive and therefore will not be walking around. This is not the case when
Shoot has the non-deterministic effect of making Ollie dead or leaving Ollie alive
(suppose that the gun is not working well). With the same restriction, Ollie may
be dead and not walking in one situation and alive and not walking in the other.
Assuming one can walk as long as one is alive, then the later situation makes no
sense. The same holds true without the restriction but this time Ollie will be dead
and walking in one situation. If shoot also has a non-deterministic effect on walking,
we are no better off.
These cases are prevented with integrity constraints as in (Kartha & Lifschitz, 1994).
Our language could be extended to include constraints as in (Baral et al., 1997) but
our interest in non-determinism is its effect on knowledge. We discuss the topic of
integrity constraints in Section 9.
Most translations for dialects of A are to extended logic programs. Our trans-
lation is to epistemic logic programs because of its ability to represent knowledge
and incomplete information. To the best of our knowledge this is the first use of
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epistemic logic programs in a translation from action languages. The closest work
related to our results is presented in (Baral & Son, 1997). In that paper A is also
extended to handle sensing actions but the semantics is some what limited be-
cause they work with a three value semantics and only approximate knowledge.
Furthermore, in their language sensing actions have no conditional effects. These
restrictions allow Baral and Son to write translations into extended logic programs.
Showing whether is possible to find a translation into extended logic programs or
first order logic of our domains is an open question.
9 Future Work
We already mentioned the need to clarify the complexity of adding sensing actions
to domain descriptions. Our translation suggests that it might be computationally
more complex to deal with conditional sensing actions than sensing with no condi-
tions. Two other possible directions of research are: First, the ability of an agent to
query itself about what it knows (i.e introspection). This is useful when the cost of
executing a series of plans is expensive maybe in terms of time. Allowing an agent
to query whether it knows that it knows something may be a cheaper alternative
and cost effective. The use of a modal operator as shown below may be sufficient
to accomplish this.
if ¬knows(ϕ) then [α] (28)
where ϕ is a test condition (as defined in Section 5), α a plan, and knows(ϕ) would
be an introspective operator on the test condition.
Take for example Agent A in Fig. 1 from Section 2. Agent A knows that Ollie is
wet (denoted by wet), but does not know if it is raining outside (denoted by rain).
Agent A would have to find a window and then look out that window to see if it
is raining outside. Suppose the program or control module for finding a window in
a building is long and very costly as far as battery power, Agent A would have to
find a window and then check for rain. Agent B would benefit from the conditional
below
if ¬knows(ϕ) then [findWindow, lookOutside]
Without an introspective operator, both Agent A and Agent B would have to find
a window and then look outside. Agent B can save on battery power if it has the
ability to query itself on what it knows.
Second, we could investigate expanding the initial epistemic state. At present,
domains only may start from a situation with only one initial epistemic state. For
more states or to represent multiple initial situations in a domain, the language to
describe domains must be extended with modal operators.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, integrity constraints could be added. In-
tegrity constraints define dependency relationships between fluents. Taking the
example from the previous section, walking depends on Ollie being alive. This
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could be represented following the approach outlined in (Kartha & Lifschitz, 1994;
Lifschitz, 1996)
never ϕ if ψ (29)
where ϕ and ψ are conjunctions of fluent literals. It states that ϕ can not be true
when ψ is true. Our example with Ollie would look like this
never walking if ¬alive
Conditions of effect are used throughout this paper. An example of a executability
condition is the fact that one has to be at a light bulb to change the light bulb.
Executability conditions found in (Levesque, 1996) could be implemented using the
methods found in (Kartha & Lifschitz, 1994; Lifschitz, 1996).
impossible A if ψ (30)
where A is an action and ψ is a conjunction of fluent literals. The execution of
action A cannot take place as long as ψ is true.
Using (30) we could express the constraint that in order to change the bulb, one
has to be at the lamp as
impossible changeBulb if ¬atLamp
This paper will conclude with three thoughts. One is relaxing the assumption
that an agent has incomplete but always correct knowledge of its world. One could
imagine the agent not only reasoning on information that it knows is true, but also
reasoning on what it believes is true. At present we have not explored this topic.
The other idea is given that Ak is a high level action description language that
deals with incomplete information across multiple possible worlds, it stands to rea-
son that Ak could be translated to formalisms, such as Levesque’s (Levesque, 1996;
Scherl & Levesque, 1993) or autoepistemic logic (Moore, 1985; Marek & Truszczynski, 1991),
which also hold this property. The third refers to the termination of routines; there
are certain tasks for which routines can be limited by a sensing action that de-
termines the “size” of the problem. Take for example the number of pages in a
book or the number of doors on the second floor of an office building. The number
of pages contained in a book will ensure the termination of a search for a word
through that book. The same applies to the number of doors on the second floor
with respect to a security routine which checks that all the doors on the second
floor are locked. For this type of task, a counter is sufficient. To include counters, we
do not require constraints but variables in Ak. These loops correspond to for-loops
in regular programming languages. Consider the situation described in 5.4. On the
floor of a room there are cans. An agent is given an empty bag and instructed to fill
the bag with cans. We assume that there are more than enough cans on the floor
to fill the bag. We can model the space left in the bag by having initially true one
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(and only one) of the following fluents.
spaceLeft(0)
spaceLeft(s(0))
...
spaceLeft(sn(0))
...
The effect of drop can be now described by the effect proposition:
r1 : drop causes spaceLeft(x) if spaceLeft(s(x))
However, we need to restrict the world to only allow one spaceLeft fluent to be
true at any moment. This can be described with a constraint of the form
never spaceLeft(x) ∧ spaceLeft(y) if x 6= y
Note that the constraint encodes a ramification of drop since not only the ex-
ecution of the action drop makes spaceLeft(x) true, but also indirectly causes
spaceLeft(s(x)) to become false.
An orthogonal problem to the issue of constraints, is that we still need in our
domain a value proposition that tells us how much space we initially have in the
bag. Adding the initial value proposition is not a completely satisfactory solution
since the plan
while nospaceLeft(0) do [dropCanInBag]
fills the bag irrespectively of the initial situation and (in normal circumstances)
the plan will always terminate. Furthermore, in a realistic setting, plans need to
consider limitation of resources. Plans may need to limit the amount of time devoted
to any task or limit the amount of energy that can be used. These bounds can be
applied to all tasks, but still a counter is required. Further research in termination,
specially in a common-sense approach to proof of termination is necessary to deal
with loops in plans.
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A While-evaluation Function
Definition A.1
Let E be the set of all situations and P the set of all total functions f mapping
situations into situations, P = {f | f : E → E }. We say that for any pair of
functions f1, f2 ∈ P , f1 ≤ f2 if and only if for any Σ ∈ E if f1(Σ) 6= ∅, then
f1(Σ) = f2(Σ).
The next proposition follows from the above definition.
Proposition A.2
The above relation ≤ defines a partial order in P .
Moreover, this partial order is a complete semi-lattice with the bottom element
equal to the function that maps every situation to ∅. We will denote the bottom
element by f∅.
Definition A.3
Let α be a plan and Γ a function that maps plans and situations into situations.
Let ϕ be a conjunction of fluent literals. Then, we define the function FΓα,ϕ : P → P
such that for any function f ∈ P ,
FΓα,ϕ(f)(Σ) =


Σ if ϕ is false in Σ
f(Γ(α,Σ)) if ϕ is true in Σ
∅ otherwise
Our goal is to show that FΓα,ϕ is continuous. For this, we will need to show that
for any directed set D ⊆ P , the least upper bound of D, denoted by
⊔
D exists,
and that FΓα,ϕ(
⊔
D) =
⊔
{FΓα,ϕ(d) | d ∈ D}. A directed set is a set such that for
any finite subset of it, the least upper bound of that set exists, and belongs to the
directed set. The existence of
⊔
D follows from the following proposition.
Proposition A.4
Let D be a directed subset of P , and let d ∈ D. If d(Σ) = Σ
′
6= ∅, for a situation
Σ, then for any d
′
∈ D either d
′
(Σ) = ∅ or d
′
(Σ) = Σ
′
.
It follows from this proposition that,
⊔
D(Σ) =
{
∅ if ∀d ∈ D, d(Σ) = ∅
Σ
′
if ∃d ∈ D such that d(Σ) = Σ
′
and Σ 6= ∅
A similar function is defined by
⊔
{FΓα,ϕ(d) | d ∈ D}. This function will be used in
the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem A.5
For any plan α and any conjunction of fluent literals ϕ, the function FΓα,ϕ is con-
tinuous with respect to the order ≤.
Proof: Let
⊔
FΓα,ϕ[D] denote the function
⊔
{FΓα,ϕ(d) | d ∈ D}. To prove the theo-
rem, it suffices to show that, for any directed set D ⊆ P , FΓα,ϕ(
⊔
D) =
⊔
FΓα,ϕ[D].
Let Σ be a situation.
(a) If ϕ is false in Σ then for any f ∈ P , FΓα,ϕ(f)(Σ) = Σ. Hence,
FΓα,ϕ(
⊔
D)(Σ) = Σ =
⊔
FΓα,ϕ[D](Σ).
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(b) If ϕ is true in Σ, then FΓα,ϕ(
⊔
D)(Σ) =
⊔
D(Γ(α,Σ)). Let
⊔
FΓα,ϕ[D](Σ) = Σ
′
.
By Proposition A.4, Σ
′
= ∅ iff FΓα,ϕ(d)(Σ) = ∅, for any d ∈ D since F
Γ
α,ϕ(d)(Σ) =
d(Γ(α,Σ)) and D is directed. Therefore, FΓα,ϕ(
⊔
D)(Σ) must be ∅. If Σ
′
6= ∅, then
for every d ∈ D such that FΓα,ϕ(d)(Σ) 6= ∅, it must be the case that F
Γ
α,ϕ(d)(Σ) = Σ
′
since FΓα,ϕ(d)(Σ) = d(Γ(α,Σ)) and D is directed. Then F
Γ
α,ϕ(
⊔
D)(Σ) = Σ
′
.
(c) When ϕ is neither true nor false in Σ, the proof is similar to part (a) since
FΓα,ϕ(f)(Σ) = ∅ for any f ∈ P .
We define the powers of FΓα,ϕ as follows:
1. FΓα,ϕ ↑ 0 = f∅.
2. FΓα,ϕ ↑ n+ 1 = F
Γ
α,ϕ(F
Γ
α,ϕ ↑ n).
3. FΓα,ϕ ↑ ω =
⊔
{FΓα,ϕ ↑ n | n ≤ ω}.
From the continuity of FΓα,ϕ the corollary below follows.
Corollary A.6
The least fix-point of FΓα,ϕ is F
Γ
α,ϕ ↑ ω.
B Proofs
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 7.3 by givingn a detailed proof
of the correctness of the translation for simple domains. The proof for the general
case is a direct extension. In our proofs we will use the splitting lemma of extending
logic programs (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994). For completeness we will include some
definitions and the statement of the lemma below.
Consider a nonempty set of symbols called atoms. A literal is an atom possibly
preceded by the classical negation symbol ¬. A rule is determined by three finite
set of literals - the set of head literals , the set of positive subgoals and the set of
negated subgoals. The rule with the head literals L1, . . . , Lq, the positive subgoals
Li+1, . . . , Lm and the negated subgoals Lm+1, . . . , Ln is written as
L1 or . . . or Lq ← Lq+1, . . . , Lm,not Lm+1, . . . , Ln
The three parts of a rule r are denoted by head(r), pos(r) and neg(r); lit(r)
stands for head(r) ∪ pos(r) ∪ neg(r).
Definition B.1
(Splitting set) (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994) A splitting set for a logic program Π is
any set U of literals such that, for every rule r ∈ Π, if head(r) ∩ U 6= ∅ then
lit(r) ⊆ U . If U is a splitting set for Π, we also say that U splits Π. The set of rules
r ∈ Π such that lit(r) ⊆ U is called the bottom of Π relative to the splitting set U
and is denoted by bU (Π). The subprogram Π− bU (Π) is called the top of Π relative
to U .
Definition B.2
(Partial evaluation) (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994) The partial evaluation of a program
Π with splitting set U w.r.t. a set of literals X is the program eU (Π, X) defined as
follows. For each rule r ∈ Π such that:
(pos(r) ∩ U) ⊆ X ∧ (neg(r) ∩ U) ∩X = ∅
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put in eu(Π, X) the rule r
′ which satisfies the following property:
head(r′) = head(r), pos(r′) = pos(r)− U, neg(r′) = neg(r)− U .
Definition B.3
(Solution) (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994) Let U be a splitting set for a program Π. A
solution to Π w.r.t. U is a pair (X,Y ) of sets of literals such that:
• X is an answer set for for bU (Π);
• Y is an answer set for eU (Π− bU (Π), X);
• X ∪ Y is consistent.
Lemma B.4
(Splitting lemma) (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994) Let U be a splitting set for a program
Π. A set A of literals is a consistent answer set of Π if and only if A = X ∪ Y for
some solution (X,Y ) to Π w.r.t. U.
From now on we will refer to the simple domain description 20, as domain de-
scription to simplify the statements.
The proof of Theorem 7.3 (Theorem: Given a consistent domain description D
and a plan β. D |= F after β iff ΠQD |= holds after plan(F, β).) is organized as
follows:
1. First, we will prove that the epistemic logic program translation models cor-
rectly the execution of a single non-sensing action. Intuitively this can be done
by looking at all the predicates of the form holds(f, res(a, s0)), for any non-
sensing action a. Furthermore we should be able to replace the initial constant
s0 with any fixed situation constant s of the form res(a1, . . . , res(ak, s0) . . .).
In the proof we will show that given any situation constant s, state σ, and
0-model of the domain Φ0, we can find a sub-set of the program ground(ΠD)
in which assuming s to be the initial situation constant one of its belief sets
corresponds to Φ0. We will also prove the other direction. That is, for any be-
lief set of the mentioned sub-set of ground(ΠD), there exists a corresponding
function Φ0, 0-model of D. This covers the general case of a single non-sensing
action applied to a situation since, by the definition of 2.7, this reduces to the
application of 0-interpretations to each of the states in the situation.
2. The second part of the proof extends the first part to cover the execution of
sensing actions. In this case the sub-set of ground(ΠD) includes rules with
the modal operator K. We show that each world view of the sub-program
corresponds to an interpretation Φ, model of D. We also show that for any
model Φ of D there is an associated world view of the sub-program.
3. The next step extends step 2 from the application of a single action to the
application of any sequence of actions by induction.
4. The final step extends the proof from sequence a of actions to complex plans.
The proof shows by structural induction on the complexity of the plans that
given a fixed world view any plan (that terminates) can be reduced to the
execution of a sequence of actions.
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Given a situation constant s, denote by Π1(D,s) the subprogram of Ground(ΠD)
that is restricted to those rules in ground(ΠD), such that either the only situation
constant appearing in the heads is of the form res(a, s) for an action symbol a, or
is of the form ab(f, a, s) for a fluent literal f and action symbol a.
For any possible action a, we will denote by Π1(D,a,s) the subprogram of Π
1
(D,s)
that is restricted to those rules in ΠD that only involve the action a in its predi-
cates, besides other action symbols occurring in s. We call a domain description a
universal domain if there are no value propositions in the domain. Given a univer-
sal domain description D, and state σ, we denote by Dσ the domain consisting of
D ∪ {initially f : f ∈ σ} ∪ {initially ¬f : f 6∈ σ}.
Definition B.5
For a domain description D, let σ be a state, s a situation constant, and Φ0 a
0-interpretation, We define the set of literals A(Φ0,σ,s) as follows:
For any action a and any fluent f ,
1. holds(f, s) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) ⇐⇒ f ∈ σ,
2. holds(f¯ , s) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) ⇐⇒ f 6∈ σ,
3. holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) ⇐⇒ f ∈ Φ0(a, σ),
4. holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) ⇐⇒ f 6∈ Φ0(a, σ).
5. ab(f, a, σ) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) if and only if there exists an object effect proposition
of the form
a causes f if p1 . . . pm
such that p1 . . . pm holds in σ or a non deterministic effect proposition of the
form
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
in D such that p1, . . . , pm holds in σ and f holds Φ0(a, σ).
6. ab(f¯ , a, σ) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) if and only if there exists an object effect proposition
of the form
a causes ¬f if p1 . . . pm
such that p1 . . . pm or a non deterministic effect proposition of the form
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
in D such that p1, . . . , pm and f does not hold in Φ0(a, σ).
Nothing else belongs to A(Φ0,σ,s).
Definition B.6
Let D be a domain description, Φ0 a 0-interpretation, and σ a state. We will say
that the pair (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model of the domain description D if σ is an
initial state of D and Φ0 one of its 0-models.
In the next two theorems we will prove that the logic program models correctly
the execution of a single non-sensing action.
Theorem B.7
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Let D be a consistent universal domain description with no knowledge laws, and σ
a state. If (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model of Dσ, then A(Φ0,σ,s) satisfies every rule in
Π1D(σ,s) , for any situation constant s.
Proof
Assume that (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model of Dσ. Then any fact holds(f, s) or
holds(f¯ , s) in Π1(Dσ ,s) is such that either holds(f, s) is in A(Φ0,σ,s) or holds(f¯ , s)
is in A(Φ0,σ,s), which is obvious. Furthermore, for any literal of the form holds(f, s)
(resp. holds(f¯ , s)) in Π1(Dσ ,s) obtained from the translation of a proposition of the
form initially f (resp. initially ¬f), we will have by construction that holds(f, s) ∈
A(Φ0,σ,s) (resp. holds(f¯ , s) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s)). Now, let us take a pair of rules of the form
holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(p1, s) . . . , holds(pm, s)
ab(f, a, s)← holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s),not holds(true, s)
obtained from the translation of a proposition of the form
a causes f if p1, . . . , pm
, and assume that holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s). Then by construction,
p1, . . . , pm holds in σ and holds(true, s) 6∈ A(Φ0,σ,s). Therefore ab(f, a, s) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s)
and f is in Φ0(a, σ). Consequently, holds(f, res(a, s)) holds in A(Φ0,σ,s).
The rules:
holds(true, res(A,S))← holds(true, S)
holds(F, S)← holds(true, S)
are trivially satisfied since there are no atoms of the form holds(true, s) in A(Φ0,σ,s).
Now we will make several considerations on A(Φ0,σ,s) to evaluate the other rules
(ground instances of the inertia rule and rules obtained from the translation of
non-deterministic effect propositions):
1. ab(f, a, s) holds in A(Φ0,σ,s).
Any rule of the form holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) ← holds(f, s),not ab(f, a, s) (in-
stance of the inertia rule) is removed from Π1(Dσ ,s) to verify that A(Φ0,σ,s) is
a belief set of Π1(Dσ ,s). Moreover, by the definition of A(Φ0,σ,s), there must be
an effect proposition with one of the following forms
a causes f if p1, . . . , pm
with p1, . . . , pm true in σ or
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
in Dσ with p1, . . . , pm true in σ and holds(f, res(a, s)) member of A(Φ0,σ,s)
by case (3) above. So any pair of rules of the form
ab(f, a, s)← not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s)), . . . holds(pn, s)),not holds(true, s)
holds(f, res(a, s))← not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s), . . . holds(pn, s)
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coming from the translation of a non-deterministic effect proposition of the
form
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
will be trivially satisfied in A(Φ0,σ,s). The other two rules obtained from the
non-deterministic effect propositions are of the form
ab(f¯ , a, s)← not holds(f, res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s)), . . . , holds(pn, s),not holds(true, s)
holds(f¯ , res(a, s))← not holds(f, res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s), . . . holds(pn, s)
and they will also be removed from Π1(Dσ ,s) to verify that A(Φ0,σ,s) is a belief
set of Π1(Dσ ,s), since holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s), and this concludes the
proof for this case.
2. ab(f¯ , a, s) holds in A(Φ0,σ,s).
Similar to previous case.
3. Neither ab(f, a, s) nor ab(f¯ , a, s) are in A(Φ0,σ,s).
In this case we will have no effect propositions of the form:
• a causes f if p1, . . . , pn
• a causes f¯ if p1, . . . , pn
• a may affectf if p1, . . . , pn
inDσ with p1, . . . , pn true in σ. Therefore any rule r in Π
1
(Dσ ,s)
with predicates
involving not , a and f , will be such that the body of r does not hold in
A(Φ0,σ,s), unless, possibly for those rules of the form
holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(f, s),not ab(f¯ , a, s)
holds(f¯ , res(a, s))← holds(f¯ , s),not ab(f, a, s)
instances of the inertia rule. So we will verify these by cases,
• holds(f, s) holds in A(Φ0,σ,s), then holds(f¯ , s) does not belong to A(Φ0,σ,s)
and there is nothing to verify for the second rule. The first rule is trans-
formed into
holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(f, s)
and it is satisfied by A(Φ0,σ,s) because f is in σ and since there are no effect
propositions of the above types, and f is true in Φ0(a, s), by definition of
A(Φ0,σ,s), we have holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s).
• holds(f¯ , s) holds in A(Φ0,σ,s)
The proof is similar to the previous case.
Theorem B.8
Let D be a consistent universal domain description with no knowledge laws, and
σ be a state. If (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model of Dσ, then A(Φ0,σ,s) is a belief set of
Π1D(σ,s) , for any situation constant s.
By the above theorem we just need to prove that A(Φ0,σ,s) is minimal in the family
of models of Π1D(σ,s) . Let B be a proper subset of A(Φ0,σ,s) and Q some predicate
in A(Φ0,σ,s) \B. Then Q could be a literal of one of the following five types:
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i.- Q = holds(f, s), in this case there will be a fact in Π1(Dσ ,s) not covered by B,
so it would not be a belief set of Π1(Dσ ,s).
ii.- Q = holds(f, res(a, s)). f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) since Q is in A(Φ0,σ,s),
7 therefore,
— If there is a rule “a causes f if p1, . . . , pm” in Dσ with p1, . . . , pm holding
in σ, there is a rule holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s)
in Π1(Dσ ,s) with holds(p1, s) . . . , holds(pm, s) members of A(Φ0,σ,s) and by
(i),
holds(p1, s) . . . , holds(pm, s) hold in B, therefore this rule will not be sat-
isfied in B.
— If there is a rule a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm with p1, . . . , pm in σ, since
holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) can not be in B (otherwise A(Φ0,σ,s) would be incon-
sistent) and holds(f, res(a, s)) is not in B, we will have that B does not
satisfies the rule
holds(f, res(a, s))← not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)), holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s).
— If there are no effect propositions in Dσ involving a and f , then, we have
that f is in σ, because in this case f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) if and only if f ∈ σ, and
the rule that will not be satisfied by B is the (ground instance of the)
inertia rule holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(f, s),not ab(f¯ , a, s).
iii.- Q = holds(f¯ , res(a, s))
The proof of this case is similar to the previous case.
iv.- Q = ab(f, a, s)
In this case we have that there is either an effect proposition of the form
a causes f if p1, . . . , pm
with p1, . . . , pm true in σ or
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
in Dσ with p1, . . . , pm true in σ, and holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s).
Hence, one of the following two rules are not satisfied in B
ab(f, a, s)← holds(p1, s) . . . holds(pm, s),not holds(true, s)
ab(f, a, s)← not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s),not holds(true, s).
v.- Q = ab(f¯ , a, s).
Similar to previous case.
We prove completeness in two steps. First, we show that if a belief set of Π1(Dσ ,s) is
defined as in Defintion B.5 then (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model of Dσ. Then we show
that every belief set of Π1(Dσ ,s) must be of this form.
Theorem B.9
7 Note that by consistence of Dσ (we are assuming that (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model) there is no
rule of the form “a causes ¬f if p1, . . . , pm” in Dσ with p1, . . . pm holding in σ.
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Let D be a consistent universal domain description with no knowledge laws, Φ0 a
0-interpretation, and σ a state. If A(Φ0,σ,s) is a belief set of Π
1
(Dσ ,s)
, then (Φ0, σ) is
a 0-specific model of Dσ.
Proof
Let A(Φ0,σ,s) be a belief set of Π
1
(Dσ ,s)
. Clearly, by construction, σ is an initial state
of Dσ. Now let f be a fluent such that there is an effect proposition of the form
“a causes f if p1, . . . , pm” in Dσ, and assume that p1, . . . , pm hold in σ. Then, by
construction, there is a rule of the form
holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s)
in Π1(Dσ ,s) such that holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s).
Therefore holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A(Φ0,σ,s) and hence f ∈ Φ0(a, σ). The proof is
analogous for effect propositions of the form a causes ¬f if p1, . . . , pm. If f is a
fluent such that there are no effect propositions of the above two types we have two
possible situations.
(i) If there are no non-deterministic effect propositions of the form
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
with p1, . . . , pm holding in σ, we will have that there are no rules in Π
1
(Dσ ,s)
such
that ab(f, a, s) appears in the head of the rule and whose body holds in A(Φ0,σ,s).
Therefore by the rules
holds(f, res(a, s))← holds(f, s),not ab(f, a, s) and
holds(f¯ , res(a, s))← holds(f¯ , s),not ab(f, a, s),
(ground instances of the inertia rule), we will have that either holds(f, res(a, s)) is
in A(Φ0,σ,s) or holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) is in A(Φ0,σ,s), since either f ∈ σ or f 6∈ σ, forcing
either holds(f, s) or holds(f¯ , s) to be in A(Φ0,σ,s). Thus, holds(f, res(a, s)) (resp.
holds(f¯ , res(a, s))) is in A(Φ0,σ,s) if and only if holds(f, s) (resp. holds(f¯ , s)) is in
A(Φ0,σ,s). Therefore f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) if and only if f is in σ.
(ii) On the other hand, if there is a proposition of the form
a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
in Dσ with p1, . . . , pm holding in σ, by construction, we will have in Π
1
(Dσ ,s)
the
following rules
holds(f, res(a, s)) ← not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s)
holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) ← not holds(f, res(a, s)),
holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s)
ab(f, res(a, s)) ← not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)),not holds(true, s),
holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s)
ab(f¯ , an, res(a, s)) ← not holds(f, res(a, s)),not holds(true, s),
holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s)
Thus, since A(Φ0,σ,s) is a belief set of Π
1
(Dσ ,s)
and the holds(pi, s) are assumed to
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belong to A(Φ0,σ,s) for every i, then either holds(f, res(a, s)) or holds(f¯ , res(a, s))
must be in A(Φ0,σ,s), but not both. Therefore it does not matter if f is or is not
part of Φ0(a, σ). Hence (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific model of Dσ.
Observe that for any domain description D, any state σ and any initial situation
constant s, a set of predicates A will be a belief set of Π1(D,s) if and only if A
is the union of belief sets of Π(D,s,a), for each possible action a. A =
⋃
{Aa :
a is a possible action} with each Aa a belief set of Π(D,s,a). This is because if a1
and a2 are two different actions then none of the predicates in rules in Π(D,s,a1)
appear in any predicate of any rule in Π(D,s,a2), so the computation of the belief
sets for one of the programs does not affect the computation for the other one.
Theorem B.10
Given a consistent domain description D, and a situation constant s. If A is a belief
set for Π1(D,s) , then there exists a state σ, and a 0-specific model Φ0 of Dσ such
that A = A(Φ0,σ,s).
Proof
By definition of Π1D,s, A must be complete. That is, for any fluent f we have
that either holds(f, s) is in A or holds(f¯ , s) is in A. Thus, if we let σ = {f :
holds(f, s) ∈ A} and Φ0 be such that for any possible action a, f ∈ Φ0(a, σ) if
and only if holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A, we will have by completeness that f 6∈ σ if and
only if holds(f¯ , s) is in A and f 6∈ Φ0(a, s) if and only if holds(f¯ , res(a, s)) ∈ A.
Moreover, if some predicate ab(f, a, s) is in A then one of the following facts holds:
• There is a rule in Π1(D,s) whose body is
holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s),not holds(true, s)
and whose head is ab(f, a, s) such that holds(pi, s) ∈ A for any i = 1, . . . ,m,
and holds(true, s) 6∈ A. Thus, there must be an effect proposition of the form
“a causes f if p1, . . . , pm” in D with p1, . . . , pm true in σ.
• There is a rule in Π1(D,s) whose body is
not holds(f¯ , res(a, s)), holds(p1, s), . . . , holds(pm, s), not holds(true, s)
whose head is ab(f, a, s) such that holds(f, res(a, s)) and each holds(pi, s)
are in A, for each i = 1, . . . ,m, and holds(true, s) is not in A. Therefore,
in this case there exists a non-deterministic effect proposition of the form
“a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm” in D with f, p1, . . . pm true in σ.
If for some fluent f , ab(f, a, s) is in A, we will have by similar reasons that there
exists a proposition of the form
a causes ¬f if p1, . . . , pm or a may affectf if p1, . . . , pm
in D such that p1, . . . , pm hold in σ and f 6∈ Φ0(a, σ).
So we have proved that A = A(Φ0,σ,s), and by Theorem B.10, (Φ0, σ) is a 0-specific
model.
We now extend the proof to handle sensing actions. Let Mod0(D,Σ) denote the
set {(Φ0, σ) : 0-specific model of D, σ ∈ Σ}, where Σ is the set of initial states
46 Jorge Lobo, Gisela Mendez and Stuart R. Taylor
of D. Note that the set can be empty if there is no state in Σ that is an initial state
of D.
Definition B.11
Given a consistent situation Σ, and an interpretation Φ. (Φ,Σ) will be a 1-specific
model of a consistent domain description D if:
1. Σ is an initial situation of D.
2. For any non-sensing action a, Φ(a,Σ) =
⋃
Φ0∈Mod0(D,Σ)
⋃
σ∈Σ{Φ0(a, σ)}.
3. For each sensing action a, if
a causes to know f1 if ϕ1
...
a causes to know fs if ϕsa
are all the knowledge laws in D where a occurs. Then, Φ(a,Σ) must be con-
sistent and if sa = 0, Φ(a,Σ) = Σ; otherwise Φ(a,Σ) =
⋂
l=1,...,s Σl such
that each Σl is a situation (fl, ϕl)-compatible with Σ. (Recall that since D is
simple, all the fi are different).
Definition B.12
Let (Φ,Σ) be a 1-specific model of a domain description D. Denote by AssoD(Φ,Σ)
the set of 0-specific models of D such that for any non-sensing action a, Φ(a,Σ) =⋃
σ∈Σ{Φ0(a, σ)}.
Let a be a sensing action. Define:
Aa(σ,s) = {holds(f, res(a, s)) : σ |= f with f a fluent literal } if σ ∈ Φ(a,Σ).
Otherwise,
Aa(σ,s) = {holds(true, res(a, s))} ∪ {holds(f, res(a, s)) : f fluent literal }.
Let A′(Φ0,σ,s) = A(Φ0,σ,s) ∪
⋃
a∈Sensing A
a
(σ,s).
Let A(Φ,Σ,s) = {A
′
(Φ0,σ,s)
: (Φ0, σ) ∈ AssoD(Φ,Σ)}.
As a straightforward consequence of this definition we have that for any fluent f
and any action a, Φ(a,Σ) |= f iff A(Φ,Σ,s) |= holds(f, res(a, s)).
For any set A of literals we will denote by σA the state σA = {f : holds(f, s) ∈ A}
We will denote by Dn.s the set of value and effect propositions in D, and by Dsen
the set of knowledge laws in D.
As a corollary of the theorems [B.8, B.10] we will have the soundness and com-
pleteness of the logic program translation for the execution of a single action (sens-
ing or not). The next corollary shows soundness and Corollary B.14 shows com-
pleteness.
Corollary B.13
Let D be a consistent domain description. If (Φ,Σ) is a 1-specific model of D then
A(Φ,Σ,s) is a world view of Π
1
(D,s).
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Proof
Let us suppose that (Φ,Σ) is a 1-specific model of D. We will prove that A(Φ,Σ,s)
is a world view of Π1(D,s). In other words, we will show that A(Φ,Σ,s) is the col-
lection of belief sets of [Π1(D,s)]A(Φ,Σ,s) (see Section 6 for the definition of [Π]A
and [Π]A
A
). Given an A ∈ A(Φ,Σ,s), let A = A
′
(Φ0,σ,s)
, and denote by Π the pro-
gram [Π1(D,s) \ Π
1
(Dn.s,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
which is equal to [Π1(Dsen,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
union all the
rules of the form holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(true, s) and holds(f, res(a, s)) ←
holds(true, res(a, s)) where f is a fluent literal and a is a sensing action.
The set U = lit(Π1(Dn.s,s)) split [Π
1
(D,s)]A(Φ,Σ,s) , and by theorem B.8 A(Φ0,σ,s) is
a belief set of Π1(Dn.s,s), moreover bU (Π
1
(D,s)) = Π
1
(Dn.s,s) and any answer set of
eU ([Π
1
(D,s)]A(Φ0,σ,s) \Π
1
(Dn.s,s), AΦ0,σ,s)) is a belief set of AΦ0,σ,s)).
Hence by Splitting Lemma we only need to prove that A is a belief set of A(Φ0,σ,s)∪
Π. We first prove that all the rules in the program hold in A and then we show that
A is minimal.
Obviously any fact in A(Φ0,σ,s) ∪Π is in A, thus we will prove that any rule R in
Π holds in A. Let, for a given sensing action a,
a causes to know f1 if p
1
1, . . . , p
1
n1
...
a causes to know fsa if p
sa
1 , . . . , p
sa
nsa
be all the knowledge laws in D, involving a, and Φ(a,Σ) =
⋂sa
l=1Σl where each Σl
is (fl, p
l
1, . . . , p
l
nl
)-compatible with Σ. The rules R in Π that mention a either in its
body or in its head will be evaluated as follows:
1. If Σ |= fl or Σ |= ¬fl, there are no rules in the program with the predicate
holds(true, res(a, s)) in the head that are not ground instances of domain
independent rules ( because any rule in Π1(Dsen,s) will be removed, to get
[Π1(Dsen,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
after checking
¬Kholds(f1, res(a, s)),¬Kholds(f¯1, res(a, s))).
2. If Σ 6|= fl and Σ 6|= ¬fl, then either
(a) Φ(a,Σ) |= pl1, . . . , p
l
nl
, and Φ(a,Σ) |= fl. In this case, R must be one of
the following:
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(p¯l1, s)
...
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(p¯lnl , s)
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(f¯l, s)
and each of these rules are verified in A, because; if holds(f¯l, s) is in A or
for some i holds(p¯li, s) ∈ A then σA |= p¯
l
i or σA |= f¯l and in both cases
σA 6∈ Φ(a,Σ), and hence, holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A,by definition of Aa(σ,s).
(b) Φ(a,Σ) |= pl1, . . . , p
l
nl
, and Φ(a,Σ) |= f¯l This case is similar to (a) changing
the last rule for
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(fl, s).
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3. Σ 6|= fl and Σ 6|= ¬fl, and there exists i = 1, . . . , nl, such that Φ(a,Σ) 6|= pli.
In this case, there is only one rule that remains in the program;
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(pl1, s), . . . , holds(p
l
nl
, s)
Now, if for any i = 1, . . . , nl, holds(p
l
i, s) ∈ A, then σA |= p
l
i, for every
i = 1, . . . , nl, and σA 6∈ Φ(a,Σ). Thus, holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A.
4. From the domain independent rules, R could also be of the form
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(true, s)
But, by construction of A, holds(true, s) 6∈ A, and thus, R is satisfied by A.
5. The last rules to consider, also coming from the domain independent rules, are
all the rules of the form holds(f, res(a, s)) ← holds(true, res(a, s)), where f
is a fluent literal. If holds(true, res(a, s)) belongs to A then, by construction,
σA 6∈ Φ(a,Σ). Therefore, by construction too, holds(f, res(a, s)) also belongs
to A, for every f , fluent literal.
To prove the minimality of A, let C be a proper subset of A and h a predicate in
A \ C.8 We will find a rule R in [Π1(D,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
such that R does not hold in C.
If h is of the form ab(f, a, s), holds(f, s) or holds(f, res(a, s)), with a a non-
sensing action, then R can be found in [Π1(Dn.s,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
by Theorem [B.8]. Thus,
all these h must be in C. Therefore, it suffices to consider the case when h =
holds(f, res(a, s)), with a a sensing action. If h = holds(f, res(a, s)), with f a
fluent literal, and the rule holds(f, res(a, s)) ← holds(true, res(a, s)) is satisfied
in C, then holds(true, res(a, s)) 6∈ C, in which case, if holds(true, res(a, s)) is in
A′(Φ0,σ,s) = A then σ 6∈ Φ(a,Σ), hence we will have that there exists an l = 1, . . . , sa,
such that σ 6∈ Σl,then since Φ(a,Σ) is fl, pl1, . . . , pnl-compatible with Σ and the
remark at the end of [B.12] we will have that one rule R of the following:
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(f¯l, s)
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(fl, s)
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(p¯l1, s)
...
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(p¯lnl , s)
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(pl1, s), . . . , holds(p
l
nl
, s)
has to be such that both i) R ∈ [Π1(Dsens,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
and ii) the fluent literals ap-
pearing on the body of R will be in σA. Hence the body of R will be true in
A and therefore in C, thus we can conclude that R is not satisfied by C. If
holds(true, res(a, s)) is not in A, then σ ∈ Φ(a,Σ) and holds(f, res(a, s)) is in
A, but this happens if and only if f ∈ σ, which is true iff holds(f, s) ∈ A, and the
inertia rule will not be true in C. To complete the proof we need to show that any
belief set of [Π1(D,s)]A(Φ,Σ,s) is of the form A
′
(Φ0,σ,s)
, for some (Φ0, σ) ∈ AssoD(Φ,Σ).
Take now A, a belief set of [Π1(D,s)]A(Φ,Σ,s) . By the splitting lemma, the set A0 =
A \ {holds(f, res(a, s)) : a sensing action }, is a belief set of Π1(Dn.s,s). Then by
8 Recall that A = A′
(Φ0,Σ,s)
.
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(B.10) there exists (Φ0, σ) in AssoD(Φ,Σ) such that A0 = A(Φ0,σ,s) = A(Φ0,σA,s)
taking Φ(a,Σ) =
⋃
σ∈Σ{Φ0(a, σ)}, it only remains to be shown that for any sensing
action a, both of the following are satisfied: (i) If σA ∈ Φ(a,Σ) then f ∈ σA ⇔
holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A, and (ii) σA 6∈ Φ(a,Σ)⇔ holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A.
For case (i), let σA ∈ Φ(a,Σ). Then, for any l = 1, . . . , sa, σA ∈ Σl. The rules with
heads of the form holds(f, res(a, s)) and f a fluent literal are: holds(f, res(a, s))←
holds(true, res(a, s)) and the one of the ground instances of the inertia rule. The
body of the first rule is false in A because any rule with holds(true, res(a, s)) in its
head must have its body false in A. Then, holds(f, res(a, s)) ∈ A ⇔ holds(f, s) ∈
A⇔ f ∈ σA.
For (ii), holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A if and only if there exists a rule R which body is
true in A and its head holds(true, res(a, s)). Hence, R must be one of the following
rules:
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(f¯l, s)
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(fl, s)
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(p¯l1, s)
...
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(p¯lnl , s)
holds(true, res(a, s)) ← holds(pl1, s), . . . , holds(p
l
nl
, s)
for some l = 1, . . . , sa, and in any case, the rule R belongs to [Π
1
(D,s)]A(Φ,Σ,s) and
its body is true in A, if and only if σA 6∈ Σl. Hence, σA 6∈ Φ(a,Σ).
Corollary B.14
(Completeness) Let D be a consistent domain description. If A is a world view of
Π1(D,s) then there exists a 1-specific model (Φ,Σ) of D such that A = A(Φ,Σ,s).
Proof
Let A be a world view of Π1(D,s). Let Σ = {σA : A ∈ A}. If A ∈ A, Φ
A
0 will be a 0-
interpretation such that A(ΦA0 ,σA,s) = A \ {holds(f, res(a, s)) : a is a sensing action
and f is true or a fluent literal}, which can be found making use of Theorem [B.10].
We define an interpretation Φ such that AssoD(Φ,Σ) = {(ΦA0 , σA) : A ∈ A}, and
Φ(a,Σ) = {σA : holds(true, res(a, s)) 6∈ A} for any sensing action a. Note that if
(Φ,Σ) is a 1-specific model of D then A = A′
(ΦA0 ,σA,s)
for any A ∈ A. Thus, we will
show that (Φ,Σ) is a 1-specific model of D and we will have that A = A(Φ,Σ,s).
It is clear that Σ is the initial situation of D. Then, if a is a non-sensing action,
by definition, Φ(a,Σ) =
⋃
{{ΦA0 (a, σA)} : A ∈ A} =
⋃
{{Φ0(a, σ)} : (Φ0, σ) ∈
AssoD(Φ,Σ)}.
If a is a sensing action and, a causes to know fl if p
l
1, . . . , p
l
nl
, l = 1, . . . , sa
are exactly the knowledge laws where a appears, we need to show that for each l =
1, . . . , sa, there exists a Σl, (fl, p
l
1, . . . , p
l
nl
)-compatible with Σ such that Φ(a,Σ) =⋂
l=1,...,sa
Σl.
1. If A |= holds(fl, s) or A |= holds(f¯l, s) then let Σl = Σ.
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2. If A 6|= holds(fl, s) and A 6|= holds(f¯l, s) and A |= holds(pli, res(a, s)), for
i = 1, . . . , nl, then:
(a) if A |= holds(fl, res(a, s)), then let Σl = {σ ∈ Σ : σ |= pl1, . . . , p
l
nl
, fl}.
(b) if A |= holds(f¯l, res(a, s)), then let Σl = {σ ∈ Σ : σ |= pl1, . . . , p
l
nl
, f¯l}.
3. If A 6|= holds(fl, s) and A 6|= holds(f¯l, s) and A 6|= holds(pli, res(a, s)), for
some i = 1, . . . , nl, we let Σl = {σ ∈ Σ : ∃k = 1, . . . , nl, σ 6|= plk}.
We need to show next that Φ(a,Σ) =
⋂sa
l=1Σl. For that, we will prove that for
any σA ∈ Σ, σA 6∈
⋂
l=1,...,sa
Σl if and only if holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A.
First we will show that if σA 6∈
⋂
l=1,...,sl
Σl, then holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A. Let
k be an l such that σA 6∈ Σl. Thus, since σA ∈ Σ then Σ 6|= fk and Σ 6|= ¬fk and
case (1) above does not occur, and one of the following cases must hold:
2.a. A |= holds(pki , res(a, s)), for every i = 1, . . . , nk, andA |= holds(fk, res(a, s)).
Therefore, either σA 6|= pkj for some j = 1, . . . , nk or σA 6|= fk. Hence,
holds(p¯kj , s) ∈ A or holds(f¯k, s) ∈ A and the following rules will be part
of [Π1(D,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
:
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(p¯kj , s)
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(f¯k, s)
Thus, holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A.
2.b. A |= holds(pki , res(a, s)), for i = 1, . . . , nk, and A |= holds(f¯k, res(a, s)), is
similar to (2.a).
3. A 6|= holds(pki , res(a, s)), for some i = 1, . . . , nk. Therefore, for every j =
1, . . . , nk, σA |= pkj . Hence A |= holds(p
k
j , s) and the following rule will be
part of [Π1(D,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
:
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(pk1 , s), . . . , holds(p
k
nk
, s)
Thus, holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A.
For the other direction, assume holds(true, res(a, s)) ∈ A. Then, it must be the
case that there exists a rule in [Π1(D,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
with holds(true, res(a, s)) in the
head and its body true in A. Note that this rule cannot be holds(true, res(a, s))←
holds(true, s) by the construction of A. Thus,A 6|= holds(f, s) andA 6|= holds(f¯ , s);
otherwise there will be no rule in [Π1(D,s)]
A
A(Φ,Σ,s)
with holds(true, res(a, S)) in its
head (these are ground instances of rules derived from knowledge laws). We will
inspect the remaining rules with holds(true, res(a, s)) in the head and we will show
that there exists Σk such that σA 6∈ Σk.
1. If the rules are of the form:
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(p¯kj , s)
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(f¯k, s)
then A |= holds(pki , res(a, s)), for i = 1, . . . , nk, and A |= holds(fk, res(a, s)).
Therefore, since holds(p¯kj , s) or holds(f¯k, s) has to belong to A, σA 6∈ Σk.
2. If the rules are of the form:
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(p¯kj , s)
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(fk, s)
then, similar to 1, A |= holds(pki , res(a, s)), for i = 1, . . . , nk, and A |=
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holds(f¯k, res(a, s)). Therefore, since holds(p¯
k
j , s) or holds(fk, s) has to belong
to A, σA 6∈ Σk.
3. If the rule is of the form:
holds(true, res(a, s))← holds(pk1 , s), . . . , holds(p
k
nk
, s)
then A 6|= holds(pki , res(a, s)), for some i = 1, . . . , nk. Therefore, since for
every j = 1, . . . , nk holds(p
k
j , s) has to be in A, σA 6∈ Σk.
The next step is to show soundness and completeness for sequences of actions.
Sequences of actions are the most simple plans. We then extend the proof to plans
of all classes. The general proof will be by induction on the complexity of the plans.
Thus, we start by formally defining complexity and other definitions required for
the inductions.
Definition B.15
We will define the complexity of a plan β (comp(β)) by: if the empty plan is [],
comp([]) = 0. For an action a comp(a) = 1. For complex plans, comp( if ϕ then α)
and comp( while ϕ do α) is comp(α)+ 1 and comp( if ϕ then α1 else α2) and
comp([α1, α2] is comp(α1) + comp(α2)
We will say that a plan α is an n-plan if it has complexity n, it will be an ≤ n-
plan if it has complexity less or equal than n. Pn will denote the set of n-plans, and
P≤n the set of ≤ n-plans.
We define the complexity of a situation constant s inductively as 0 if s = s0; or
1 plus the complexity of s′ if s = res(a, s′), for any action a. A situation s will be
called an n-situation if its complexity is n. The complexity of a predicate of the
form holds(f, s) with f a fluent literal, or holds(true, s), will be the complexity of
s, the complexity of predicates of the form ab(f, a, s), with f a fluent literal and a
an action will be equal to the complexity of s plus one, the complexity of predicates
of the form find situation(β, s1, s) will be the complexity of β plus the complexity
of s1, and the complexity of a predicate of the form holds after plan(F, β) will be
the complexity of the plan β. We will say that a predicate h is an ≤ n-predicate, if
h has complexity m and m ≤ n. Given a plan α, [α1] will denote the plan α and
[αn+1] will denote the plan [α|[αn]]. Denote by ΠnD the subprogram of ΠD restricted
to those rules in ΠD with ≤ n-predicates. Note that in any k-predicate in ΠnD, the
constant situation is a sequence of k actions.
Given a domain description D denote by Dr the sub-domain of D obtained when
we remove from D any value proposition.
Definition B.16
For any n > 0, we will say that a pair (Φ,Σ) where Φ is an interpretation and Σ a
situation, is an n+1-specific model of D if and only if it is an n-specific model of D
and for any sequence of actions seqn = a1, . . . , an, (Φ,ΓΦ([seqn],Σ)) is a 1-specific
model of Dr (i.e. D minus the value propositions). (Φ,Σ) will be a specific model
of D if it is an n-specific model of D for any n ≥ 1.
Definition B.17
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Given a sequence of actions seq = a1, . . . , an and a situation constant s, res((seq), s)
denotes the situation constant res(an, . . . , res(a1, s)), seq∅ denotes the empty se-
quence and res((seq∅), s) will be equal to s. Let Actn be the set of all the sequences
of n actions. For any set of literals A we take σ(A,(seq)) as the state such that
f ∈ σ(A,(seq)) ⇔ holds(f, res((seq), s0)) ∈ A.
Definition B.18
Given a pair (Φ,Σ) of interpretation and situation, n ≥ 0 and the situation constant
s0, we will denote by A
n+1
(Φ,Σ,s0)
the following family of sets:
• if n = 1, A1(Φ,Σ,s0) = A(Φ,Σ,s0)
• If n ≥ 1, let for any set A of (≤ n+1)-predicates, An and A1 denote the sets
of (≤ n)-predicates in A and (n+ 1)-predicates in A (resp.). Then, An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
is defined as a family of sets A of (≤ n+1)-predicates, such that the following
is satisfied:
1. An ∈ An(Φ,Σ,s0)
2. If holds(true, (seqn, s0)) is inAn then A1 =
⋃
seqn∈Actn
A(seqn) with A(seqn)
the set of all the predicates of the form holds(true, res((seqn, a), s0)) or
holds(f, res((seqn, a), s0))
3. If holds(true, (seqn, s0)) is not in An then A1 = An ∪
⋃
seqn∈Actn
A(seqn)
where A(seqn) is A
′
(Φ0,σ(An,seqn),res((seqn),s0))
for some (Φ0, σ(An,(seqn))) in
AssoDr (Φ,ΓΦ((seqn),Σ).
Lemma B.19
Given n > 0, a consistent domain description D, a pair (Φ,Σ), n-specific model of
D, the initial situation constant s0. We will have that for any fluent literal f and
any sequence of actions seq = a1, . . . , an, holds(f, res((seq), s0) holds in A
n
(Φ,Σ,s0)
if and only if f ∈ ΓΦ([seq],Σ).
Proof
The proof is by induction on n and it is straightforward from the definition of
An+1(Φ,Σ,S)
The next corollary proves by induction on the length of the sequence of actions
that the logic program translation is sound and complete for the execution of a
sequence of actions.
Corollary B.20
Given a consistent domain description D and n > 0. A is a world view of ΠnD if
and only if there exists a pair (Φ,Σ), n-specific model of D such that
A = An(Φ,Σ,s0)
Proof
• The base case (n = 0) follows from B.13 and B.14.
• Suppose the result is valid for any m ≤ n.
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• (⇒) Let A be a world view of Πn+1D . As in Definition B.18, define for any
A ∈ A, An to be the subset of A restricted to those predicates in A involving just
≤ n-predicates, soAn = {An : A ∈ A} will be a world view of ΠnD, and by inductive
hypothesis there is a pair (Φ1,Σ), n-specific model of D such that An = A
n
(Φ1,Σ,s0)
.
We first define an interpretation Φ such that (Φ,Σ) is n + 1-specific model
of D. Given an action a, let A′′ be the set {holds(f, res((seqn), s0)) ∈ An :
holds(true, res((seqn), s0)) 6∈ An ∧ seqn ∈ Actn} and A1 be A
′′ union
[{holds(f, res((seqn, a), s0)) : seqn is any sequence of n actions}
∪{ab(f, a, res((seqn), s0)) : seqn is any sequence of n actions}
∪{holds(true, res((seqn, a), s0)) : seqn is any sequence of n actions}] ∩A
Note that A = An ∪ A1. By the splitting lemma, A1 is a belief set of A′′ ∪⋃
seqn∈Actn
[Π1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0)]
A
A
.
Hence by B.14 there exists an interpretation Φ2 and a 0-interpretation Φ0 such
that for any sequence of n actions seqn with holds(true, res((seqn), s0)) 6∈ An, the
following properties are satisfied:
1. (Φ2,ΓΦ1([seqn],Σ)) is a 1-specific model of D
r,
2. (Φ0, σ(An,(seqn))) is in AssoDr (Φ2,ΓΦ1([seqn],Σ)).
3. A1 =⋃
{A′(Φ0,σ(An,(seqn)),res((seqn),s0))
: seqn ∈ Actn ∧ holds(true, res((seqn), s0)) 6∈
An} ∪A′′.
Defining Φ such that for any sequence of actions seqn ∈ Actn if the atomic
formula holds(true, res((seqn), s0)) is not in An, then ΓΦ([seqn],Σ) is equal to
ΓΦ1([seqn],Σ), we will have that (Φ,Σ) is an n-specific model of D. Moreover if
we take Φ such that for any action a and any sequence of actions seqn ∈ Actn
, Φ(a,ΓΦ([seqn],Σ)) = Φ2(a,ΓΦ([seqn],Σ)), we will have that for any sequence of
actions seqn ∈ Actn, (Φ,ΓΦ([seqn],Σ)) is a 1-specific model of Dr. Therefore, (Φ,Σ)
is an n+ 1-specific model of D.
It is clear by construction that either the predicate holds(true, res((seqn), s0))
is a member of An, and by the inertia rules, A1 is the set of predicates of the
form holds(true, res((seqn, a), s0)) and holds(f, res((seqn, a), s0)) with a an action,
(seqn) a sequence of n actions and f a fluent literal, or holds(true, res((seqn), s0)) 6∈
An and for any sequence of n actions seqn the following propositions hold:
1. (Φ0, σ(An,(seqn))) ∈ AssoDr (Φ,ΓΦ([seqn],Σ)),
2. A1 = A
′
(Φ0,σ(An,(seqn)),res((seqn),s0))
Therefore by definition of An+1(Φ,Σ,s0) we have proved that A ∈ A if and only if it
is in An+1(Φ,Σ,s0).
(⇐) Reciprocally, let (Φ,Σ) be an (n + 1)-specific model of D. Then, by B.13,
induction and by the splitting lemma, to prove that An+1(Φ,Σ,s0) is a world view of
Πn+1D , it suffices to show that for any A, A ∈ A
n+1
(Φ,Σ,s0)
if and only if A = An ∪BA
where An is the set of predicates in A of ≤ n-complexity and BA is a belief set of
the program
54 Jorge Lobo, Gisela Mendez and Stuart R. Taylor
Π = An ∪ [Π
n+1
D −Π
n
D]An+1
(Φ,Σ,s0)
= An ∪ [
⋃
seqn∈Actn
Π1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
In order to prove this, we will show that the beliefs sets of the program Π are
exactly the sets of the form An ∪A1 defined in B.18.
First note that the belief sets of [
⋃
seqn∈Actn
Π1(Dr,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
are the
unions of belief sets of [Π1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
where seqn is varying over the
set of sequences of n actions. This is so because these programs are independent of
each other.
Hence, we will calculate the belief sets of each programΠ1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
where seqn ∈ Actn and we will prove that the set of these union is A
n+1
(Φ,Σ,s0)
.
To show this, let seqn be a sequence of n actions. Then there are two possible
cases:
1. holds(true, res((seq), s0)) ∈ An, and An ∪ [Π1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
has
only the belief set BA = An ∪ A1 with A1 the set of predicates of the form
holds(true, res((seq, a), s0)) or holds(f, res((seq, a), s0)) where a is any action
and f is any fluent literal.
2. holds(true, res((seq), s0)) 6∈ An and by theorem [B.14], any belief set of
An ∪ [Π1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
is equal to An ∪ A′(Φ0,σ(An,seqn),res((seqn),s0))
for some 0-interpretation such
that (Φ0, σ(An,seqn)) ∈ AssoDr (Φ,ΓΦ(([seqn, a],Σ)).
Therefore the belief sets of An ∪ [Π1(Dr ,res((seqn),s0))]An+1(Φ,Σ,s0)
are precisely the
elements on An+1(Φ,Σ,s0), and this implies that A
n+1
(Φ,Σ,s0)
is a world view of Πn+1D .
Definition B.21
Given a domain description D, an initial situation constant s0 and a specific-model
(Φ,Σ) of D, we will denote by Aω(Φ,Σ,s0) the following family of sets, A ∈ A
ω
(Φ,Σ,s0)
if and only if for any n ≥ 1 there exist An ∈ An(Φ,Σ,s0) and An+1 ∈ A
n+1
(Φ,Σ,s0)
with
An ⊆ An+1, and A =
⋃
n≥1An We will denote by A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
the family of sets A,
such that A is the union of sets AΠ and AQ where AΠ is an element of A
ω
(Φ,Σ,s0)
and AQ is a belief set of AΠ ∪ [Q]
AΠ
Aω
(Φ,Σ,s0)
Lemma B.22
Given a consistent domain description D and the initial situation constant s0, A
is a world view of ΠD, if and only if there exists a specific model (Φ,Σ) of D such
that A = AQ(Φ,Σ,s0).
Proof
Given a world view A of ΠωD, and A ∈ A, we will denote by AΠ the subset of A
restricted to those predicates in A of the form holds(f, s) or ab(f, a, s) where s is a
situation constant and a is an action, then the set AΠ = {AΠ : A ∈ A} is a world
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view of ΠD, and by (B.20) there exists a specific model of ΠD such that AΠ is
equal to Aω(Φ,Σ,s0), since [Q]
A
A
is equal to [Q]A
Aω
(Φ,Σ,s0)
, applying the splitting lemma
to [ΠQD]
A
A
= [ΠD]
A
A
∪ [Q]A
A
we have the result.
Theorem B.23
Let D be a domain description, s0 be an initial constant situation and (Φ,Σ)
be a specific model of D. Then, given a sequence of actions seq = a1, . . . , ak,
and the situation constant s = res((seq), s0), we will have that, for any situa-
tion constant s1 and any plan β, there exists a sequence of actions seq(β,s) such
that ΓΦ([seq, seq(β,s)],Σ) is equal to ΓΦ(β,ΓΦ([seq],Σ) and for any A ∈ A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
,
find situation(β, s, s1) belongs to A if and only if s1 = res((seq, seq(β,s)), s0).
Proof
The proof will be a double induction, using the loop nesting in the plan and the com-
plexity of the plans. Thus, the while-complexity of a plan β, denoted by wcomp(β),
is 0 if β is either the empty plan [] or an action a, max(wcomp(α1), wcopm(α2) If
β = if ϕthen α1else α2 or β = [α1|α2], 1 + wcomp(α) if β = while ϕ do α.
Taking wcomp(β) = 0 we will do induction on comp(β).
• If β = [], the result is immediate, because
ΓΦ(β,ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) = ΓΦ([],ΓΦ([seq],Σ)),
and for any A ∈ AQ(Φ,Σ,s0) find situation([β], s, s1) is in A if and only if
s1 = s. Therefore taking seq(β,s) = seq∅ the claim follows.
• Suppose the theorem is valid for ≤ n-plans.
• Let β be an (n+ 1)-plan. Then we have the following possibilities
I) β = [a|α] where α is an n-plan and a is an action. Then, by inductive hy-
pothesis ΓΦ(α,ΓΦ([seq, a],Σ)) is equal to ΓΦ([seq, a, seq(α,res(a,s))],Σ), there-
fore we will have that
ΓΦ(β,ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([a, α],ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) =
ΓΦ(α,ΓΦ([seq, a],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([seq(α,res(a,s))],ΓΦ([seq, a],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([a, seq(α,res(a,s))],ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([seq(β,s)],ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([seq, seq(β,s)],Σ).
Moreover for any A in AQ(Φ,Σ,s0), find situation(β, s, s1) is in A if and only if
find situation(α, res(a, s), s1) is in A.
Thus, if we take seq(β,s) = (seq(α,res(a,s)), a), since by inductive hypoth-
esis find situation([α], res(a, s), s1) is in A if and only if s1 is equal to
res(((seq, a), seq(α,res(a,s))), s0), we have that find situation([β], s, s1) is in
A if and only if s1 = res((seq, (a, seq(α,s))), s0) which is equal to the situation
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res((seq, seq(β,s)), s0), and
ΓΦ([β],ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([seq, seq(β,s)],ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) =
ΓΦ([seq(β,s)],ΓΦ([seq],Σ))
II) β = [ if ϕ then α1, α2] where α1, α2 are n1 and n2-plans respectively, with
n1+n2 = n then, we have that for any A in A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
, find situation(β, s, s1)
is in A if and only if either:
i) holds(ϕ¯, s) holds in AQ(Φ,Σ,s0) and find situation([α2], s, s1) is in A,
or
ii) holds(ϕ, s) holds in AQ(Φ,Σ,s0) and find situation([α1, α2], s, s1) is in A.
By inductive hypothesis ΓΦ(α2,ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) is equal to ΓΦ([seq, seq(α2,s)],Σ)
and ΓΦ([α1, α2], ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) is equal to ΓΦ([seq, seq([α1,α2],s)],Σ) for the se-
quences of actions seq(α2,s) and seq([α1,α2],s)
Hence by [B.19] and inductive hypothesis, find situation(β, s, s1) is in A if
and only if either
i) ϕ¯ holds in ΓΦ([seq],Σ), and s1 = res((seq, seq(α2,s)), s0).
or
ii) ϕ holds in ΓΦ([seq],Σ), and s1 = res((seq, seq([α1,α2],s)), s0).
Thus, if we take seq(β,s) = seq(α2,s) in case i), and in case ii) seq(β,s) equal
to seq([α1,α2],s) we will have that ΓΦ(β,ΓΦ([seq],Σ)) = ΓΦ([seq, seq(β,s)],Σ))
and find situation(β, s, s1), belongs to A if and only if s1 is equal to the
situation res((seq, seq(β,s)), s0).
III) β = [ if ϕ then α1 else α
′
1, α2], where α1, α
′
1 and α2 are n1, n
′
1 and n2-
plans (resp.) with max(n1, n
′
1) + n2 = n. This case is similar to the previous
one.
IV) β = [ while ϕ do α1, α2], where α1 and α2 are n1 and n2-plans
(resp.), with n1 + n2 = n. Here we may suppose by inductive hypothesis
that for any k ≥ 0 the plans [αk1 ] and [α
k
1 , α2] verify the theorem, and we
will denote by seq(k,α1) the sequence seq(α1,s) and by seq(k,α2) the sequence
seq([α2],res((seq([αk
1
],s)
),s0)).
Using the fix-point operator TΠ defined by TΠ(I) = {p : ∃ a rule p ←
q1, . . . , qn in Π with each qi a fact in I}, for any positive logic program Π, we
know that if TΠ↑1 is defined to be equal to TΠ(∅) and TΠ↑k+1= TΠ(TΠ↑k),
then TΠ↑ω, which is the set
⋃
k≥1TΠ↑
k, is a fix-point for TΠ. Moreover A is
a belief set for [Πω(D,s0)]
A
A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
if and only if
A = T[Πω
(D,s0)
]A
A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
↑ω .
Therefore, h = find situation(β, s, s1) is in A if and only if there exists k ≥ 0
such that h is in T[Πω
(D,s0)
]A
A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
↑k+1.
Let k0 be the minimum k such that h belongs to T[Πω
(D,s0)
]A
A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
↑k+1. We
have that h ∈ T[Πω
(D,s0)
]A
A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
↑k0+1, if and only if there exists m such that
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the following properties are satisfied:
1) For any j < m holds(ϕ, res((seq, seq(j,α1)), s0) holds in A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
2) holds(ϕ¯, s′) holds in AQ(Φ,Σ,s0)
3) find situation([αm1 ], s, s
′) ∈ A
4) find situation([α2], s
′, s1) ∈ A
If we fix m with properties (1), (2), (3) and (4), we have by inductive hypoth-
esis and [B.19] that, h ∈ A if and only if ϕ holds in ΓΦ([seq, seq(m,α1)], s0),
s′ = res((seq(m,α1)), s0) and s1 = res((seq(m,α2)), s0). Hence taking seq(β,s) =
seq(m,α2), we will have that ΓΦ(β,ΓΦ([seq],Σ) is equal to ΓΦ([seq, seq(β,s)],Σ)
and h ∈ A if and only if s1 = res((seq(β,s)), s0).
The inductive step on wcomp(β) follows the same reasoning as in the base case.
Corollary B.24
Given a consistent domain description D, the initial situation constant s0 and a
specific model of D, (Φ,Σ), we will have that for any fluent f and any plan β,
hold after plan(f, β) holds in AQ(Φ,Σ,s0) if and only if f ∈ ΓΦ(β,Σ).
Proof
Let seq(β,s0) be the sequence of actions described in [B.23], such that ΓΦ(β,Σ) =
ΓΦ([seq(β,s0)],Σ) and find situation(β, s0, s1) holds in A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
if and only if s1 =
res((seq(β,s0)), s0). Then since hold after plan(f, β) holds in A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
if and only
if find situation(β, s0, s1) and holds(f, s1) hold in A
Q
(Φ,Σ,s0)
, we have by [B.19]
hold after plan(f, β) holds in AQ(Φ,Σ,s0) if and only if f ∈ ΓΦ([seq(β,s0)],Σ) =
ΓΦ(β,Σ).
Hence by [B.22] we have the following:
Corollary B.25
Given a simple and consistent domain description D and a plan β. D |= F afterβ
if and only if ΠQD |= hold after plan(F, β).
Theorem 7.3 Given a simple consistent domain description D and a plan β. D |=
F afterβ if and only if ΠQD |= hold after plan(F, β).
Proof: Direct from Corollary B.25.
